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ABSTRACT 
 Over the past six decades, Washington has recognized that its own security is 
closely connected with that of its allies around the globe. As a part of this policy, U.S. 
leaders and policy makers have endeavored to protect South Korea by extending 
deterrence against North Korea. Despite its ongoing promises, U.S. security guarantees 
have occasionally shown signs of faltering credibility. Moreover, given North Korea’s 
evolving nuclear capability, the credibility of U.S. security commitments, especially 
those tailored to the Korean Peninsula, still remain uncertain in the minds of some South 
Koreans. 
 This thesis explores South Koreans’ recent perceptions of U.S. extended 
deterrence since 2010, and examines two key factors—U.S. nuclear strategy and North 
Korea’s ICBM capability—that might affect South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. extended 
deterrence. The thesis then reveals the correlation between South Koreans’ perceptions 
and the two key factors. It argues that, contrary to the conventional wisdom, these two 
key factors do not significantly affect South Koreans’ confidence, and the impact of those 
two factors on South Koreans’ perceptions is not considerable. In fact, existing South 
Korean doubt about U.S. extended deterrence has been overestimated, and U.S. security 
guarantees have generally remained credible in South Korean eyes. Nonetheless, the 
U.S.-ROK alliance must continue to strive for the elimination of any lingering doubt 
about U.S. extended deterrence. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION  
Over the last 20 years, South Korea (formally known as the Republic of Korea, or 
ROK) and the international community have been trying to denuclearize North Korea 
within the framework of the U.S.-ROK alliance. These efforts have been unsuccessful 
and North Korea has emerged as a de facto nuclear state. On September 3, 2017, North 
Korea claimed to have successfully conducted a hydrogen bomb test (its sixth nuclear 
test). 1 On November 29, 2017, North Korea launched a missile called “Mars-15” or 
“Hwasong-15,” and Kim Jong Un, the North Korean leader, proclaimed “the completion 
of nuclear armed forces.”2 North Korea is now threatening to attack South Korea and 
even the U.S. homeland with its nuclear missiles. As a result, South Koreans’ doubts 
about U.S. extended deterrence credibility, which have existed at some level for a long 
time, have been amplified in recent years.  
This thesis researches the factors that have influenced South Koreans’ perceptions 
of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, especially with the evolving North Korean 
capability of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). Historically, U.S. extended 
deterrence has been the backbone of the U.S.-ROK alliance, which has been in place to 
thwart potential North Korean aggression since the end of the Korean War. This thesis 
hopes to deepen our understanding of the factors that may enhance the credibility of U.S. 
extended deterrence, thereby contributing to the solid U.S.-ROK alliance. Specifically, 
what factors influence South Koreans’ perceptions of the credibility of U.S. extended 
deterrence commitments? And how might North Korea’s development of an ICBM 
capable of reaching the continental United States change South Koreans’ confidence in 
U.S. extended deterrence? The following underlying questions are addressed within the 
major research question.  
                                                 
1 Min-ho Noh, “North Korea’s Announcement, Successful Hydrogen Bomb Test for ICBM,” New 
Daily, September 3, 2017, http://www.newdaily.co.kr/site/data/html/2017/09/03/2017090300018.html. 
2 Byung-soo Park, “Kim Jong-un’s Declaration, The Completion of Nuclear Armed 
Forces,” Hankyoreh, November 29, 2017, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/defense/821244.html. 
2 
• First, what factors have generally or historically promoted or diminished 
the credibility of extended deterrence?  
• Second, what conditions in particular make South Koreans trust or distrust 
the U.S. extended deterrence pledges on the Korean Peninsula?  
• Third, does North Korea’s nuclear capability development, especially the 
possibility of its nuclear-armed ICBMs reaching the U.S. homeland, alter 
the factors that make South Koreans suspicious of U.S. extended 
deterrence credibility within the U.S.-ROK alliance?   
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION  
Over the past six decades, Washington has recognized that its own security is 
closely connected with that of its allies around the globe. As a part of this policy, U.S. 
leaders and policy makers have endeavored to protect South Korea by extending 
deterrence against North Korea. U.S. extended deterrence over South Korea has often 
been described as an “umbrella” analogy to signal U.S. commitments within its foreign 
policies and strategies protecting South Korea from the hostile North Korea.  
Despite ongoing U.S. promises, these security guarantees have occasionally 
shown signs of faltering credibility. To meet these concerns, the United States initiated 
“tailored extended deterrence (or tailored assurance)” through the 2010 U.S. Nuclear 
Posture Review (NPR). Moreover, the United States announced in the 2018 NPR that it 
would use a “more tailored deterrent strategy” for the Asia-Pacific region, including 
South Korea.3  
Nevertheless, given North Korea’s evolving nuclear capability, the credibility of 
U.S. extended deterrence’s commitments and implementation, especially those tailored to 
the Korean Peninsula, still remains uncertain in the minds of some South Koreans. In this 
regard, this thesis may contribute to identifying factors that shape South Koreans’ 
                                                 
3 U.S. Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2018): 25–37, https://media.defense.gov/2018/Feb/02/2001872886/-1/-1/1/2018-
NUCLEAR-POSTURE-REVIEW-FINAL-REPORT.PDF. 
3 
perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence, inclusive of the dynamics in the Korean 
Peninsula, which takes into account the North Korean nuclear capability. This 
contribution may be valuable in two ways.  
On the one hand, given U.S. security interests, the impact of North Korea’s 
nuclear capabilities in Northeast Asia in terms of nonproliferation remains significant. If 
the U.S. policy of nuclear guarantee against North Korea’s nuclear threat is not effective 
in this region, a so-called “nuclear domino phenomenon” may arise. South Korea, not to 
mention Japan and Taiwan, might reverse its intention to remain within the U.S. nuclear 
umbrella and consequently jump into proliferation, despite possible pressures and 
sanctions from the international community. Otherwise, at least, South Korean voices 
demanding relocation of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons on their soil may become 
more intense. In this respect and appreciating the factors that ameliorate or diminish 
South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence, this study may contribute to 
understanding the dynamics of the U.S. nuclear guarantee’s efficacy. Thereby, it can help 
U.S. policy makers to engage more efficiently in the problems surrounding extended 
deterrence and the nonproliferation regime.   
On the other hand, considering South Korea’s security interests, the 
implementation of a firmly accepted U.S. extended deterrence is paramount due to its 
security environment, directly facing North Korea’s nuclear threat. Many South Koreans, 
however, still have both trust and distrust of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence in 
the Korean Peninsula, and this perception tends to change over time with evolving 
security environments. Just as Western Europeans of the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) raised the question of whether the United States would sacrifice 
Washington to defend Berlin during the Cold War, some South Koreans may doubt 
whether the United States would sacrifice Los Angeles to protect Seoul. Doubts about 
U.S. credibility may also come from some influential figures inside the United States 
who advocate the withdrawal of U.S. troops from the Korean Peninsula to resolve North 
4 
Korea’s nuclear problem.4 Although all of their remarks were part of efforts to resolve 
that problem, those remarks were enough to trigger South Koreans’ doubts about the U.S. 
commitment of extended deterrence.  
The consequences of infringing on South Korea’s vital interest—assuring its 
national security—may eventually become a vicious cycle that deepens Washington’s 
concerns. If South Korea’s security perceptions lead to an independent path to nuclear 
armament, this would likely, in turn, cause serious concerns for Washington. More 
precisely, if North Korean nuclear missile development drives many South Koreans to 
assert the need to nuclearize the ROK in reaction to the North,5 this could ultimately 
drive other states’ nuclear ambitions in Northeast Asia as well.   
Before exploring existing literature, it is necessary to clarify the ambiguity of the 
term, “perception.” Differences in perceptions of extended deterrence between allies and 
adversaries are normal. Former British secretary of state for defense Denis Healey said of 
extended deterrence in Europe that “It takes only five percent credibility of American 
retaliation to deter the Russians, but ninety-five percent credibility to reassure the 
Europeans.”6 This remark has two critical implications. First, making the allies believe in 
defenders’ commitment is harder than making the adversaries do so. Second, adversaries 
nevertheless tend to view the circumstances of extended deterrence from the worst 
possible scenarios that the protectors would indeed respond to their hostile actions. 
Consequently, from adversaries’ perspectives, the credibility of the protector’s security 
promise may be higher than allies’ perceptions. In other words, while the credibility of 
                                                 
4 Sang-hun Choe and David E. Sanger, “After North Korea Test, South Korea Pushes to Build Up Its 
Own Missiles,” New York Times, July 29, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/29/world/asia/us-south-
korea-north-korea-missile-test.html, in July 2017, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger made the 
proposal to then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson that the United States should promise to withdraw forces 
from South Korea to induce China’s cooperation after North Korea’s missile test called ‘Mars-14’; and 
Jane Perlez and Sang-hun Choe, “Bannon and Dunford Remarks Muddle U.S. Strategy for North 
Korea,” New York Times, August 16, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/16/world/asia/north-korea-
trump-moon-jae-in-south.html, former White House chief strategist Steve Bannon, in an August 2017 
media interview, claimed that the United States should consider withdrawal of its forces from South Korea 
in exchange for a moratorium of North Korea’s nuclear programs. 
5 Seung-jun Lee, “Gallup, Holds Nuclear Weapons, 60% in Favor, 35% Against,” Hankyoreh, 
September 8, 2017, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/politics_general/810212.html. 
6 Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (New York: W.W. Norton, 1989), 243. 
5 
extended deterrence may be questionable from the perspectives of allies, it may not be so 
from those of adversaries. At the same time, allies’ confidence in the credibility of 
extended deterrence can also influence adversaries, through contribution to alliance 
strength.7 Therefore, this thesis focuses only on the allies’ perspectives—specifically, 
South Koreans’ perceptions.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature review considers three areas of research in line with the components 
within the major research question: 1) factors generally affecting the credibility of 
extended deterrence; 2) factors specifically affecting South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. 
extended deterrence’s credibility; 3) the impact of North Korea’s nuclear ICBMs on 
South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence’s credibility. 
1. General Factors Affecting Credibility 
What factors have generally and historically affected—promoted or diminished—
the credibility of extended deterrence? An extensive body of research uncovers the key 
factors that may improve the credibility, if well managed, or otherwise may make it 
worse. Relevant scholars appear to consider political resolve and military capabilities to 
(re)assure defenders’ commitment as crucial factors for the credibility of extended 
deterrence. 
The deterrent effects of alliance commitments within the framework of extended 
deterrence have been the subject of much scholarly research. Studies on the theoretical 
mechanics of alliances show that signaling commitments appears to improve the 
credibility of extended deterrence. According to James Morrow, an alliance relationship 
itself could operate as a signal of the intention to come to the aid of a threatened ally, and 
such a signal has some credibility.8 Matthew Fuhrmann’s claim implies a formal alliance, 
with nuclear patrons within the framework of extended deterrence, carries significant 
                                                 
7 Wade L. Huntley, “Speed Bump on the Road to Global Zero,” Nonproliferation Review 20, no. 2 
(2013): 309.  
8 James D. Morrow, “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 38, 
no. 2 (1994): 270–97. 
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deterrence effects and, thus, enhances the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.9 The 
research incorporates relevant analyses that signaling public alliance commitments by 
(nuclear) allies significantly reduces the chances of “being targeted in a militarized 
dispute.”10  
Others, by extension, underline the ways and means of defenders’ commitments 
as a significant factor concerning credible extended deterrence. Ways and means include 
not only official dialogue between protectors and protégés but also various elements 
related to security assurance commitments to transfer defenders’ will to allies. Although 
defenders often have to go to great lengths to demonstrate their will and convince allies 
through various military exercises, in combination with allies or by defenders alone, these 
scholars do not regard direct military deployment or exercises in the allies’ territories as 
the sole means of communication with allies. According to Bruce Russett, the most 
important indicators that a defender is committed to an ally are security treaty, alliance 
relationship, and trade relations, combined with economic and military aid.11 Elaine Bunn 
also holds this standpoint by arguing that credible extended deterrence “rests on the 
overall health of the alliance relationship, including shared interests, dialogue, 
consultation, and coordinated defense planning and exercises.”12 Some scholars argue 
U.S. allies and partners indeed have considerable interests in U.S. diplomatic documents, 
including official announcements by U.S. leaders and senior officials and national 
strategic guidance.13 Their claims denote that from the allies’ and partners’ eyes, the U.S. 
                                                 
9 Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, “Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk 
Costs in Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” American Journal of Political Science 58, no. 4 (2014): 919–35. 
10 Fuhrmann and Sechser, “Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in Extended 
Nuclear Deterrence,” 920. 
11 Bruce M. Russett, “The Calculus of Deterrence,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 7, no. 2 (1963): 
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official statements or signals of the perspectives on the international security environment 
would be considered as imperatives directly linked to their own security. 
Studies focusing on the protectors’ nuclear strategies often consider the variations 
in those to be gravely influential in allies’ perceptions of extended deterrence. In their 
research, “Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and Current 
Challenges for U.S. Policy,” Justin Anderson, Jeffrey Larsen, and Polly Holdorf state that 
the Obama administration’s nuclear strategy issued in the 2010 NPR, which sought to 
“balance between reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal and maintaining the ability to defend 
the United States and its allies from nuclear threats,” increased allies’ concerns about the 
possible effect on the U.S. capability.14 They point out the potential possibility contained 
in this strategic change—that the United States “may have to turn down direct allied 
requests regarding the U.S. nuclear umbrella”—could cause serious concerns for allies.15 
In his article, “Rethinking Extended Deterrence in the Korean Peninsula,” Jung-Sub Kim 
claims that the changes in the U.S. nuclear strategy seeking nuclear global-zero, with an 
antipathy toward using nuclear weapons, make U.S. commitments unreliable.16 In his 
article, “Speed Bump on the Road to Global Zero,” Wade Huntley examines how these 
reactions could in turn undermine the objectives U.S. nuclear reductions intend to 
advance.17 
Existing studies also spend a lot of time discussing how credibility is affected by 
defenders’ domestic—public or political—opinions. The key issue implied here is 
“convincing domestic public opinion that extending such protection—taking risks to 
ensure the security of a distant country—is necessary and in the national interest.”18 In 
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15 Anderson, Larsen, and Holdorf, “Extended Deterrence and Allied Assurance: Key Concepts and 
Current Challenges for US Policy,” xiv. 
16 Jung-Sub Kim, “Rethinking Extended Deterrence in the Korean Peninsula,” National Strategy 21, 
no. 2 (2015): 5–40. 
17 Huntley, “Speed Bump on the Road to Global Zero,” 305–38. 
18 Tertrais, et al., “Perspectives on Extended Deterrence,” 16.  
8 
general, public opinion may be a tolerable element, whereas it could be a major factor in 
undermining the reliability of extended deterrence or making it unsustainable in a crisis 
situation.19 Likewise, a firm conviction of and ongoing support from domestic political 
elites, equivalent to establishing consensus on a “bipartisan basis” in the United States, 
are significant if the security promises should be sustained.20 Without such consensus, as 
generations change, it could become increasingly challenging to maintain domestic 
political support for extended deterrence. 21  Over time, legislators and government 
officials may become unaware of the foundational rationale for extended deterrence and 
related mechanisms or may be less aware of their correlation between allies and national 
security.22  
The defender’s capabilities to extend deterrence have also been a central topic of 
scholarly inquiry. Relevant scholars consider the U.S. capability sufficient to protect 
allies against (potential) adversaries as a crucial factor that promotes credibility. In other 
words, this school views the ability to inflict unacceptable damage to any challenger’s 
threat as the most important and rudimentary element for convincing an ally. As noted by 
Bunn, “Of course, in order to extend deterrence, the United States must first be able to 
deter,” and she considers the U.S. capabilities—both in terms of nuclear and 
conventional—for extending its deterrence as a basic, but most important, element.23 
Terence Roehrig argues possessing enough capability to cause unacceptable damage to a 
potential adversary is the principal condition for credibility of commitment. 24  His 
argument is that a defender’s threat of punishment is fundamentally a bluff if the 
defender has no ability to inflict enormous damage to a challenger, especially with 
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nuclear weapons.25 Consequently, the crucial element here in extended deterrence is to 
clearly convince allies that the defender has enough capability to protect them.26  
2. South Koreans’ Perceptions of the Credibility 
What conditions in particular make South Koreans trust or distrust the U.S. 
extended deterrence pledges on the Korean Peninsula? Growing relevant literature 
focusing on the specific factors confined to the Korean Peninsula almost accords with the 
general tendencies identified in the preceding section. As a result, South Koreans’ 
perceptions are in line with the U.S. political resolve and the following assumptions of 
U.S. military capabilities. They are, accordingly, likely to be dependent on the variations 
in the alliance policies, U.S. nuclear strategies, and military capabilities. Ironically, 
however, even the factors analyzed as having adverse effects on South Koreans’ 
perceptions may appear to have little negative consequences as a result of the ongoing 
U.S. commitments and supplementary policies for reassurance.  
Studies on the “basing mode of alliance forces” imply forward presence of U.S. 
forces may ensure South Korea’s security in part by enhancing the credibility of U.S. 
extended deterrence. In his book, From Deterrence to Engagement: The U.S. Defense 
Commitment to South Korea, Roehrig claims, as a way to demonstrate U.S. will, that U.S. 
combat troops stay in South Korea to serve as a tripwire to guarantee U.S. responses and 
to deter or, if needed, defeat North Korea. 27  According to Roehrig, ground forces 
deployed on the forefront are difficult to withdraw during a crisis situation with North 
Korea, signaling a firm U.S. commitment to South Korea.28 Moreover, according to Park 
Chang-kwon, the degree of U.S. extended deterrence credibility is firmly underpinned by 
the mechanisms related to U.S. dedications to South Korea’s defense—”the U.S.-ROK 
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defense treaty, the existence of the United States Forces Korea (USFK), and the U.S.-
ROK combined defense system.”29 Patrick Morgan supports these views by asserting, 
“Forward presence has been crucial for credibility because no state or group thinks it can 
defeat the United States outright.”30 
In this context, some argue that withdrawing U.S. forces from the Korean 
Peninsula may become a factor in South Koreans’ deteriorating perceptions of U.S. 
extended deterrence credibility. Although the withdrawal or reduction in the size of U.S. 
troops does not necessarily mean the U.S. abandonment of South Korea, those actions 
may be enough to cause South Koreans’ doubts about the credibility of U.S. extended 
deterrence. In the late 1960s, according to Mark Fitzpatrick, former President Park 
Chung-hee was concerned about the possibility of the U.S. abandonment of South 
Korea. 31  Fitzpatrick claims that Park’s concern was exacerbated by then-president 
Richard Nixon’s unexpected announcement of the so-called “Nixon doctrine,” a new 
policy of shifting the burden of Asian allies’ conventional defense to the countries 
themselves. Two years later, the United States abruptly withdrew its Seventh Infantry 
Division from South Korea amid calls in Congress for additional withdrawals, despite 
Park’s strong objections to the move. From this point of view, South Koreans worried 
that Washington might begin a dialogue with Pyongyang behind Seoul’s back or accept 
Beijing’s demand that all U.S. troops be withdrawn from the Korean Peninsula.  
South Koreans’ fear of abandonment seems enduring. Richard Bush states that at 
the July 2009 meeting of the U.S.-ROK Strategic Dialogue, South Korean government 
officials and scholars discussed at length whether they could absolutely trust the United 
States in terms of implementing extended deterrence within the U.S.-ROK alliance.32 He 
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views that South Koreans’ fear of abandonment, in the end, “has fostered a strong desire 
for U.S. reassurance in words and deeds.”33 
Others focus on the changes in U.S. nuclear strategy as an indicator of political 
resolve, especially the Nuclear Posture Review. In his research, “Finding a Balance 
between Assurances and Abolition: South Korean Views of the Nuclear Posture Review,” 
Scott Snyder at first thinks the 2010 U.S. NPR, which is characterized by nuclear arms 
control, disarmament, and nonproliferation, raised concerns among some South Korean 
specialists about the credibility.34 Although he concludes that the 2010 NPR did not spark 
significant public debate in South Korea and was accepted by Seoul, South Koreans’ 
anxieties about the changed or even reduced role of U.S. nuclear arms in extended 
deterrence indicated South Koreans’ sensitivity to U.S. political changes. Roehrig states 
that the importance of the U.S. nuclear umbrella to South Korea’s security interests has 
been consistently articulated by South Korean defense planners and analysts.35 He thinks 
South Korean government officials made great efforts at the 2009 summit meeting 
between Presidents Barack Obama and Lee Myung-bak to obtain security commitments 
from Washington, including a plain statement on the nuclear umbrella.36 Washington, 
according to Roehrig, was reluctant to do so because of the inconsistency with President 
Obama’s speech in Prague, which emphasized reduction and ultimate elimination of 
nuclear weapons in international security environment.37 This also demonstrates South 
Koreans’ sensitivity to the changed U.S. political resolve and their concerns about the 
possibility of decreased U.S. nuclear capabilities.  
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Notably, some in this school of thought do not deny having suspicions about U.S. 
extended deterrence in South Korea, but they view that those questions may be offset by 
U.S. reassurance policy through regular consultations and high-level of meetings with 
counterparts of South Korea. In a Joint Vision Statement issued by the U.S.-ROK alliance 
on June 16, 2009, for example, the two presidents reaffirmed the solid U.S.-ROK alliance 
by stating that “the continuing commitment of extended deterrence, including the U.S. 
nuclear umbrella, reinforces this assurance.”38 Snyder observes that despite the concerns 
about U.S. nuclear strategic changes in the role of nuclear weapons, new political resolve 
and promises by the United States, which reflect South Korea’s demands and requests, 
are enough to wipe out those concerns.39 Similarly, Kim Tae-woo views the June 16 
summit as “a success in both elevating the legal standing of the nuclear umbrella as well 
as expanding the scope of protection.”40 
Apart from the factors associated with U.S. political resolve and military 
capabilities, some experts point to the importance of the contexts of historical conflicts 
between the two Koreas. They think current extended deterrence has shown limitations in 
stopping North Korea’s nuclear programs, rhetorical threats, or actual armed 
provocations and, thus, brought about South Koreans’ doubts about the credibility. A 
former brigadier general of the ROK Army claimed that U.S. extended deterrence did not 
prevent North Korean small-scale conventional provocations, like the 2010 ROK 
Cheonan Sinking and the Bombardment of Yeonpyeong.41 South Korea has empirically 
undergone numerous physical provocations by North Korea that have frequently violated 
the Armistice Agreement since 1953. 42  Despite the provisions of the Armistice 
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Agreement and the existence of U.S. extended deterrence commitments, the ongoing 
physical provocations by North Korea have often ended without appropriate retaliatory 
actions. Although no provisions exist that extended deterrence should cover small, 
regional, or low-intensity conflicts, a series of provocative acts by North Korea may have 
negative impacts on South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence credibility.  
3. The Impact of the North Korean ICBMs  
This last section of the literature review examines how North Korea’s 
development of its ICBMs might be influencing South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. 
extended deterrence. Burgeoning literature agrees that the North Korean ICBM capability 
may become a factor influencing the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence and, by 
extension, the U.S.-ROK alliance, while a few assert that North Korea’s ICBM capability 
has little such effect.   
Most scholars who analyze the impact of evolving North Korea’s nuclear ICBMs 
on South Koreans’ perspectives think North Korea’s capabilities could exacerbate South 
Koreans’ concerns about extended deterrence credibility and, in turn, may undermine the 
U.S.-ROK alliance. In his article, “Rethinking the Extended Deterrence in the Korean 
Peninsula,” Kim Seung-taek categorizes the conditions of successful extended deterrence 
against North Korea into three elements: credibility of U.S. threatening to retaliate, South 
Koreans’ firm belief in the U.S. commitment to its security guarantee, and the U.S. will 
to implement the commitments.43 He argues if any of three is not fulfilled, a decoupling 
within the U.S.-ROK alliance may occur.44  
In this regard, some scholars believe that North Korea’s ICBM capability can 
make it difficult for the United States to implement its extended deterrence commitments 
and, in turn, can diminish the strength of the U.S.-ROK alliance.45 According to Brad 
Roberts, North Korea’s nuclear capability may make the United States hesitate to counter 
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the North Korean nuclear threat by increasing the potential costs of U.S. response.46 
Similarly, Bunn states, “The security concerns of U.S. allies will change as the 
capabilities of their potential adversaries evolve.”47 Their common assumption is that 
North Korea’s nuclear missiles capable of reaching the U.S. homeland, like Los Angeles 
or New York, may significantly increase the potential risks of U.S. intervention, make 
Washington hesitate to execute retaliatory military actions, and cause the U.S.-ROK 
alliance to be decoupled.  
Concerns about decoupling are also highly relevant to Andrew O’Neil’s argument 
that the threat of punishment against attacks on a defender’s homeland is highly reliable, 
while retaliation for allies depends on a number of contextual conditions.48 His argument 
implies that the United States may not retaliate against North Korea’s nuclear attacks on 
South Korean territory due to the possibility of North Korea’s attacks on the U.S. 
homeland. In his article, “An Examination of the Probability of the U.S. Nuclear 
Extended Deterrence under the Advanced North Korean Nuclear Threat,” Park Hwee-
rhak concludes that the United States may not be able to assertively respond to North 
Korea’s nuclear threat due to the risks of being attacked by the North. Accordingly, for 
the United States, the value of South Korea may not be enough to overcome the risks, and 
the support of U.S. public opinion may remain uncertain.49 Lee Seok-soo also supports 
this view by stating that South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence 
dramatically changed after North Korea’s nuclear tests and its development of delivery 
vehicles. He claims “North Korean delivery systems with nuclear weapons” appears to 
diminish U.S. nuclear deterrence over South Korea and Japan.50 
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Contrary to the preceding arguments, another view maintains that North Korea’s 
nuclear capability, including its ICBMs, does not have much to do with extended 
deterrence credibility. As Roehrig states, the mistrust between Washington and 
Pyongyang regarding nuclear extended deterrence indeed “has an impact on North 
Korean leaders because they may not be convinced that the United States might not use 
nuclear weapons.” 51 His perspective denotes that the development of North Korea’s 
ICBM capability may not diminish the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence from the 
point of view of North Korean leaders: for them, the credibility of U.S. extended 
deterrence might be stronger than what South Koreans perceive.52 
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Based on the preceding body of knowledge about how extended deterrence 
functions generally and, in particular, in the South Korean case, this thesis examines 
more deeply two main factors that might alternatively affect South Koreans’ perceptions 
of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence: 1) how variations in the U.S. NPR, which 
expresses U.S. nuclear strategy, political resolve, and its extended deterrence capability, 
affect South Koreans’ perceptions; and 2) how North Korea’s growing nuclear ICBM 
capability could lead to worsening South Koreans’ perceptions, regardless of the U.S. 
enhanced extended deterrence strategy and capabilities. These outcomes might become 
causal factors affecting the U.S.-ROK alliance if South Koreans’ perceptions, affected by 
either U.S. declared nuclear policy or the North’s ICBM capability, lead to exacerbating 
the perceptions of the disutility of the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
1. Hypothesis #1  
If the NPR implies an intention to strengthen the nuclear weapons’ role in 
extended deterrence while South Koreans’ perceptions of extended deterrence credibility 
improve, this would indicate a specific factor that could continue to affect South 
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Koreans’ perceptions in the future. The United States began using the term “tailored 
deterrence strategy” for the first time in the 2010 NPR, which implies that the globe will 
be segmented by the U.S. strategic interests to implement extended deterrence in 
conjunction with the security environment in each region, including the Asia Pacific. The 
United States also included the term again in the 2018 NPR. By contrasting the two NPRs 
and further analyzing the changes in South Koreans’ perceptions, the thesis can identify 
how political decisions and changes in relation to the U.S. extended deterrence policies 
and force structure affect South Koreans’ perceptions. 
2. Hypothesis #2  
If South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence wanes while North 
Korea enhances its ability to mount a nuclear warhead on an ICBM and to deliver it to 
the continental United States, North Korea’s ICBM capability could be an influential 
factor affecting South Koreans’ perception of U.S. extended deterrence. If North Korea 
achieves its ultimate goal of having the ability to make its ICBM reach U.S. soil, the 
United States may become hesitant to actively intervene in a crisis situation between the 
two Koreas due to the increased possibility of North Korea’s nuclear retaliation. South 
Koreans, who have been concerned about this possibility, could thus become more 
doubtful about the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, including U.S. willingness to 
implement its commitments. By analyzing North Korea’s ICBM capability, together with 
the changes in South Koreans’ perceptions, the thesis can identify how North Korea’s 
changing ICBM capability affects South Koreans’ perceptions.  
3. Hypothesis #3  
If North Korea’s growing nuclear ICBM capability increases South Koreans’ 
concerns about the extended deterrence credibility even while the NPR is designed to 
expand the role of nuclear weapons and the relevant capability, North Korea’s nuclear 
ICBMs could be the stronger factor affecting South Koreans’ perceptions. This outcome 
would suggest that, regardless of the strengthening of U.S. nuclear capability and 
demonstrations of willingness to use that capability, North Korea’s ICBM capability 
could be an independent variable functioning as a detrimental influence on South 
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Koreans’ perceptions. Conversely, If South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. extended 
deterrence is maintained or even rises while the NPR signals to increase U.S. nuclear 
capabilities, even though North Korea’s ICBM capability is also a growing threat to the 
U.S. mainland, then U.S. nuclear strategy and its political intentions in relation to 
extended deterrence would be the more influential factor affecting South Koreans’ 
perceptions.  
E. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In order to evaluate South Koreans’ perceptions of the credibility of U.S. 
extended deterrence in the Korean Peninsula, this thesis measures South Korean 
perceptions using primary and secondary sources related to the following data: 1) ROK 
government statements and documents by high-level officials, including the Minister of 
National Defense (MND), MND spokespersons, military leaders, and the officials of the 
U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meeting (SCM); 2) leading non-government experts’ 
analyses, including academic journals, policy papers, and conference reports; and 3) 
public opinion gleaned from accredited survey institutions in South Korea. Combining 
these data, the thesis generates a full record of South Koreans’ perceptions of the 
credibility of U.S. commitments to extended deterrence.  
Utilizing this record of South Koreans’ perceptions, this thesis analyzes the 
impact of changing U.S. nuclear strategy revealed through the 2010 and 2018 NPRs. 
Both reports include the concept of “tailored deterrent strategy” for regional extended 
deterrence, including in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. This thesis analyzes 
and contrasts the two NPRs and examines how U.S. nuclear strategy, including relevant 
policies and capabilities, changed. In addition, the thesis seeks to find how key issues 
concerning the reassurance of South Korea in each NPR were addressed and framed in 
U.S. extended deterrence. Because the U.S. NPR provides a solid basis to understand 
U.S. nuclear strategy, relevant policies, and future force structure, the comparative study 
of the two NPRs contributes to understanding U.S. political decisions and its nuclear 
capabilities, which have been generally considered to have influenced the perceptions of 
18 
allies, including South Korea. The thesis, in the end, aims to test whether this 
conventional wisdom—the analyses of existing literature—appears correct.  
Furthermore, this thesis examines the influence of North Korea’s ICBM 
capability on South Koreans’ perceptions. North Korea’s ICBM capability started to 
develop rapidly after the emergence of Kim Jong-un’s regime. After the completion of 
North Korea’s missile test in late 2017, the range of the “Mars-15” or “Hwasong-15” was 
estimated to reach the U.S. homeland.53 This thesis concentrates on various secondary 
sources, such as expert analyses, associated with North Korea’s ICBM capability since 
2012. The thesis evaluates how North Korea’s ICBM capability evolved and whether 
North Korea achieved its desired objectives.  
Finally, this thesis applies the North Korean factor to the results of the NPR 
analysis and its impact on South Koreans’ perceptions. It aims to find the effect of North 
Korea’s ICBM capability on South Koreans’ perceptions regarding U.S. nuclear strategy 
and extended deterrence. In doing so, the thesis can identify whether U.S. nuclear 
strategy or North Korea’s ICBM capability is more influential in South Koreans’ 
perceptions. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND CHAPTER OUTLINE 
This thesis consists of five chapters. This first chapter has presented the main 
research question, reviewed the relevant literature, and described the hypotheses and 
methods of research. 
Chapter II presents in more detail the data for understanding South Koreans’ 
perceptions of the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence in the Korean Peninsula. To 
measure South Koreans’ perceptions, this thesis identifies three groups—political, 
academic, and public—and examines each group’s perceptions of U.S. extended 
deterrence since 2010. The thesis then measures each group’s confidence and all the 
groups’ average confidence in U.S. extended deterrence, and analyzes in more detail how 
these confidence levels have changed.   
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Chapter III identifies how U.S. nuclear strategy and North Korea’s ICBM 
capability have changed. Through the comparison and contrast of the 2010 and 2018 
NPRs, this thesis finds the key changes in U.S. political thinking concerning U.S. nuclear 
capabilities and extended deterrence, and estimates whether changed U.S. nuclear 
strategy implies the augment of its overall capabilities. The thesis then discerns the 
changes in North Korea’s ICBM capability, focusing primarily on two key criteria—
nuclear warhead standardization and the delivery range. To that end, this thesis 
summarizes the North Korean nuclear activities in chronological order related to these 
two key criteria since 2012, and based on expert analyses, estimates whether North 
Korea’s ICBM capability has evolved.  
Chapter IV first determines whether there are correlations between South 
Koreans’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence and the changes in U.S. nuclear 
strategy, including relevant policies and nuclear force structure. In the same way, this 
thesis examines the correlation between South Koreans’ confidence and the recent 
emergence of North Korea’s ICBM capability to target the U.S. mainland. During this 
process, this thesis also draws the relation between the two factors and determines which 
factor appears to be more influential in South Koreans’ changing perceptions of U.S. 
extended deterrence.  
Chapter V draws overarching conclusions from the research, addresses the key 
findings, and presents policy implications. This thesis then discusses the limitations of the 
research, which simultaneously illuminates the opportunities for future research.  
20 
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II. SOUTH KOREAN PERCEPTIONS 
This chapter intends to identify South Koreans’ perceptions of and their 
confidence in U.S. extended deterrence by using data from primary and secondary 
sources, including official and unofficial government statements and documents, 
academic experts’ analyses, and public opinions in South Korea. To this end, this chapter 
seeks to explore how South Korean perceptions vary among the political, academic, and 
public spheres.  
At a certain level, measuring the extent of South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. 
extended deterrence becomes difficult. Simplifying the various degrees of perception into 
three levels only through referring to documents and remarks might create a 
generalization or an oversimplification. Nevertheless, simplifying the range of various 
South Koreans’ perceptions helps to identify major changes in perceptions of U.S. 
extended deterrence. To determine the level of South Korean confidence in U.S. extended 
deterrence, this chapter divides South Koreans’ perceptions into three levels of 
confidence as defined in the Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Three Levels of South Koreans’ Perceptions. 
In addition, this chapter considers only the data from 2010 to 2018, the period 
during which all of these variables are included. These data provide main targets to 
explore in the following chapters on the correlation between the 2010 and 2018 NPRs 
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and South Koreans’ perceived confidence in U.S. extended deterrence, and between 
North Korea’s ICBM development and South Koreans’ confidence in the extended 
deterrence. Regarding 2018, this thesis limits the relevant data to the point before the 
relationship between the U.S.-ROK alliance and North Korea is transformed into a new 
phase of dialogue, mainly through the US-North Korea summit meeting.  
A. PERCEPTIONS OF GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS AND POLITICIANS 
To understand South Korean politicians’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence, 
it is necessary to appreciate the legal basis of U.S. extended deterrence. U.S. extended 
deterrence is based on the Mutual Defense Treaty, signed on October 1, 1953 and enacted 
on November 18, 1954, between the United States and South Korea.54 Hence, the Mutual 
Defense Treaty itself is a political symbol and legal basis for U.S. extended deterrence; 
the U.S.-ROK alliance is a framework within which U.S. extended deterrence works. If 
the treaty is the foundation on which the extended deterrence commitments are to be 
implemented, the official announcements and documents produced by ROK political 
leaders could be regarded as the South Korean politicians’ official viewpoints on U.S. 
extended deterrence.  
1. Official Perceptions of the ROK Government 
Two types of official announcements—the joint statement of each U.S.-ROK 
summit meeting and the joint communique of each U.S.-ROK SCM—represent the South 
Korean government’s official stance on U.S. extended deterrence. This section analyzes 
these key statements regarding U.S. extended deterrence and identifies how the South 
Koreans’ official confidence in U.S. extended deterrence has changed. 
a. U.S.-ROK Summit Meetings 
Given the relationship between U.S. extended deterrence and the U.S.-ROK 
alliance based on the Mutual Defense Treaty, the data dealing with broader concepts and 
                                                 
54 “Background and Significance of the ROK-US Alliance,” Ministry of National Defense, accessed 
August 6, 2018, http://www.mnd.go.kr/mbshome/mbs/mnd/subview.jsp?id=mnd_010701010000.  
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commitments of extended deterrence would be the U.S.-ROK summit talks.55 Hence, the 
joint statement after summit meeting is the most representative element to understand 
South Koreans’ official political perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence. Figure 2 shows 
bilateral summit meetings held in the United States or South Korea in relation to the 
alliance relationship. 
 
Figure 2. Summit Meetings Overview since 2010.  
From 2010 to 2018, the U.S.-ROK summit meetings were held 13 times during 
the presidency of former President Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013), former President Park 
Geun-hye (2013–2017), and current President Moon Jae-in (2017–). Of those 13 times, 
the summit talks, such as Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Nuclear Security 
Summit (NSS) and G-20, were multilateral talks with special purposes, so they did not 
give priority to issues related to extended deterrence. Therefore, this section only 
                                                 
55 During the presidency of Lee Myung-bak since 2010, summit meetings have been held with the 
United States three times. But the summit meetings held in 2010 and 2012 were Nuclear Security Summit 
(NSS). On the flipside, then President Park Geun-hye had summit meetings six times with then U.S. 
President Barack Obama, but the meetings held on September 11, 2014 and in 2016, were Asian-Pacific 
Economic Cooperation (APEC) and East Asia Summit (EAS), respectively. Following the four occasions 
of summit talks between Presidents Donald J. Trump and Moon Jae-in, two were held on September, 22, 
2017 and two in 2018, no official joint statements were issued because they were only one-day meetings to 
discuss the urgent issues associated with North Korea’s nuclear programs.  
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considers bilateral summit meetings held in the United States or South Korea concerning 
the bilateral alliance relationship. 
(1) Joint Statement in 2011 
In relation to cooperation for promoting mutual security, the former Presidents 
Barack Obama and Lee Myung-bak discussed in depth the ways to strengthen the U.S.-
ROK alliance’s capabilities and preparedness to respond more effectively and promptly 
to asymmetric threats and unexpected provocations posed by North Korea, especially its 
nuclear missile development. 56 President Obama reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to 
defend South Korea against the North’s nuclear threat, and the two presidents decided to 
continue activating the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC), which was 
newly established before the summit meeting.   
(2) Joint Statement in 2013 
The summit meeting between the United States and South Korea in 2013 was held 
with a monumental sense of the 60th anniversary of the alliance. Then Presidents Barack 
Obama and Park Geun-hye underlined that the two states would “continue to strengthen 
the alliance relationship to serve as a linchpin for peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific 
region and to respond to new security challenges in the 21st century.”57 President Obama 
reiterated a strong and firm commitment to extend the U.S. deterrent capability to the 
ROK, which meant the use of all categories of U.S. military capabilities, including 
nuclear and conventional forces.58 
                                                 
56 Sang-hyun Jin, “The Full Text, Joint Statement of The U.S.-ROK Summit,” Joongang Ilbo, October 
14, 2011, https://news.joins.com/article/6414992. 
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(3) Joint Statement in 2014  
Then Presidents Obama and Park reaffirmed a “strong and capable alliance” 
relationship.59 Considering the evolving security environment in the Korean Peninsula, 
the two presidents decided to further “develop interoperability and readiness through the 
use of annual joint and combined exercises, such as Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG), Key 
Resolve, and Foal Eagle (KR/FE).” 60  The two presidents also exchanged views on 
strengthening cooperation regarding the procurement of strategic military assets. 61  
Notably, they stated that the transition of wartime operational control (WT-OPCON) 
could be reconsidered in response to enduring North Korea’s nuclear missile threat.  
(4) Joint Statement in 2015  
Then Presidents Barack Obama and Park Geun-hye agreed to the “Joint Statement 
on North Korea.” 62 Through the joint announcement after the summit meeting, they 
highlighted that the U.S.-ROK alliance has maintained its pledge to respond to North 
Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs.63 The joint announcement stated, “we 
would maintain a firm deterrence posture, continue to modernize our alliance, and 
promote close coordination to better respond to all forms of provocations by North 
Korea.”64 
                                                 
59 “Joint Fact Sheet: The United States-Republic of Korea Alliance: A Global Partnership,” White 
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(5) Joint Statement in 2017  
At the first summit meeting between Presidents Donald J. Trump and Moon Jae-
in, the two presidents reaffirmed the U.S.-ROK alliance’s commitment to deter North 
Korea’s evolving nuclear threat to regional security and stability. 65  “To increase 
coordination on alliance relations,” they committed the foreign and defense ministries of 
the two states “to regularize a ‘2+2’ ministerial meeting” and directed the Extended 
Deterrence Strategy and Consultation Group (EDSCG) “to employ all elements of 
national power to strengthen extended deterrence.”66  
(6) Joint Press Release in 2017 
During the third summit meeting between President Trump and Moon, President 
Trump highlighted that the U.S. top priority is “to protect the United States and allies 
against North Korean aggression” and “to remain prepared to use the full range of U.S. 
military capabilities.”67 In response to the North Korea’s threat, the two summits resulted 
in agreement to further improve the U.S.-ROK alliance’s combined capabilities “through 
the acquisition of advanced military equipment and the enhanced deployment of U.S. 
strategic military assets in and around the Korean Peninsula on a rotational basis.”68 
b. U.S.-ROK Security Consultative Meetings 
Another representative element that helps to understand the official perceptions of 
South Korean politicians and government leaders is the SCM. Since 1978, when the 
United States agreed to provide South Korea with a so-called “nuclear umbrella” at the 
11th SCM,69 the United States has maintained its consistent commitments to provide 
                                                 
65 “Joint Statement between the United States and the Republic of Korea,” White House, accessed 
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extended deterrence through that meeting, in which a wide range of means based on the 
U.S.-ROK alliance are discussed in depth. This section examines statements in the 
official SCM documents and identifies key points of each SCM as well as changes in 
extended deterrence commitments. Figure 3 presents an overview of the key issues 
addressed in the SCMs held between 2010 and 2018.70 
 
Figure 3. SCMs Overview since 2010. 
(1) Joint Communique of the 42nd U.S.-ROK SCM 
The U.S. Secretary of Defense and the ROK Defense Minister reaffirmed the 
commitment to the “fundamental mission of the U.S.-ROK alliance to defend South 
Korea,” while maintaining a strong defense posture based on the Mutual Defense 
Treaty.71 Both agreed to institutionalize the Extended Deterrence Policy Committee to 
                                                 
70 From 2010 to 2018 (the 42nd to the 49th), alternating between the United States and South Korea, a 
total of eight SCMs were held.  
71 Jae-hong Kim, “National Defense Policy; The Full Text of Joint Communique of the 42nd U.S.-
ROK SCM,” Ministry of National Defense, last modified October, 11, 2010, 
http://www.mnd.go.kr/user/boardList.action?boardId=I_43915&siteId=mnd&id=mnd_010704010000. 
28 
improve the efficacy of extended deterrence through the use of the committee as a 
cooperation mechanism.72  
(2) Joint Communique of the 43rd U.S.-ROK SCM 
Both defense officials reaffirmed the commitment to continuously enhance the 
U.S.-ROK deterrence capability to stabilize the Korean Peninsula. To that end, the two 
ministers determined to initiate the “Korea-US Integrated Defense Dialogue (KIDD),” 
encompassing “various defense dialogue mechanisms.” 73  Moreover, they decided to 
develop the “EDPC Multi-year Work Plan” and the “Tailored Deterrence Strategy 
(TDS),” including future mechanisms, such as the “table-top exercise (TTX),” to further 
enhance the extended deterrence against North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction 
(WMD) threats.74 
(3) Joint Communique of the 44th U.S.-ROK SCM 
Both defense officials evaluated that the KIDD efforts have greatly contributed to 
developing and maintaining the common strategic goals of the alliance by arranging and 
harmonizing “various defense consultation mechanisms.”75 To this end, they agreed to 
further improve the “bilateral security consultations based on the KIDD” and develop the 
“TDS through utilizing the EDPC,” particularly to deter the North Korean WMD 
threats.76  
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(4) Joint Communique of the 45th U.S.-ROK SCM 
To enhance effective deterrence options, the two defense officials formally 
endorsed the bilateral TDS against the North Korean WMD threats.77 This TDS aimed to 
establish a “strategic alliance framework for tailoring deterrence against North Korean 
nuclear threat” throughout armistice and wartime. 78 The two ministers committed to 
“maintaining close consultation on deterrence matters” to make sure that U.S. extended 
deterrence “remained credible, capable, and enduring.”79 In addition, the two decided to 
continue developing a “counter-missile strategy to detect, defend, disrupt, and destroy 
(4D) missile threats” from North Korea.80 
(5) Joint Communique of the 46th U.S.-ROK SCM 
The two defense officials decided to review the TDS implementation progress on 
a regular basis “to ensure that U.S. extended deterrence remains credible, capable, and 
enduring.”81 They noted that the U.S.-ROK alliance has been “committed to maintaining 
close consultation on deterrence matters to achieve tailored deterrence against North 
Korean threats and to maximize its deterrent effects.”82 
(6) Joint Communique of the 47th U.S.-ROK SCM 
The two defense officials stated appreciation for the inauguration of “the U.S.-
ROK Deterrence Strategy Committee (DSC),” which sought “to ensure that extended 
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deterrence for the ROK remained credible, capable and enduring.”83 The DSC was to 
improve the “deterrence and response capabilities” against North Korean nuclear missile 
threats and “to promote information-sharing and interoperability.”84  
(7) Joint Communique of the 48th U.S.-ROK SCM 
Within the framework of the “2+2 Extended Deterrence Strategy and Consultation 
Group (EDSCG),” 85  the two defense officials agreed “to examine options to take 
additional steps,” such as strengthening extended deterrence capabilities, to prevent North 
Korea from miscalculating. 86  They also agreed to improve information sharing and 
interoperability in response to the North Korean nuclear missile threats.87 
(8) Joint Communique of the 49th U.S.-ROK SCM 
The defense officials committed to “developing extended deterrence-related 
policies, procedures, and consultative mechanisms under the auspices of the DSC and the 
EDSCG.”88 They also pledged to “increase the execution capabilities of the TDS, 4D 
Concept and Principles Implementation Guidelines (CPIG).” 89  The two shared the 
understanding of the need “to enhance the alliance deterrence posture” and “to explore 
ways to expand the scope of cooperation.”90 
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The South Korean politicians’ official perceptions have reflected strong 
confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. The official joint statements after the summit 
meetings and SCMs reflect a consistently supportive South Korean political stance on 
U.S. extended deterrence and do not vary in their positive perceptions of extended 
deterrence. The only variation in the joint statements has been the creation of new 
mechanisms to further improve the extended deterrence capability, and this variation has 
contributed to the ROK’s improved confidence in U.S. extended deterrence.  
Formally, the South Korean government may rarely express negative political 
positions on U.S. extended deterrence. The government’s position tends to consistently 
show a strong and steadfast alliance relationship, and the U.S.-ROK alliance has made 
concerted efforts to reflect its solid relationship in the official statements and documents. 
Due to this nature of the South Korean government’s political stance, research for 
identifying unofficial perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence in the political sphere—
namely, politicians’ personal perspectives—is needed.  
3. Unofficial Perceptions among South Korean Politicians 
Based on published news articles and interviews, this section examines South 
Korean politicians’ and government leaders’ unofficial perceptions of U.S. extended 
deterrence. It investigates the unofficial statements and remarks of government officials 
and political figures, including former and anonymous government officials. These 
informal statements will be more straightforward than the official statements and helpful 
to identify the strength of and the changes in political leaders’ authentic confidence in 
U.S. extended deterrence. 
a. In 2010 
On November 22, then Defense Minister Kim Tae-young said that he would 
review the issue of redeploying the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea at the 
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budget closing committee of the National Assembly.91 The defense minister’s statement 
that he would discuss the relocation of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to South Korea 
through the EDPC came in response to a question from a lawmaker.92 
b. In 2011 
On February 25, the former chairman of the Hannara Party Jung Mong-joon said, 
“South Korean government must consider the reintroduction of U.S. tactical nuclear 
weapons because we cannot make North Korea abandon its nuclear weapons only by the 
U.S. nuclear umbrella,” while suggesting a survey showed that 67 percent of South 
Koreans supported nuclear arming in response to the North’s nuclear threat.93  
On October 12, President Lee Myung-bak and his staff, who were visiting 
Washington, DC, for the 2011 U.S.-ROK summit meeting, received a briefing on the 
security situation at the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD). A spokesman of Cheong Wa 
Dae (the Blue House) at the time said, “It is very unusual for the U.S. military to conduct 
such a briefing on foreign leaders,” adding, “This shows the importance and closeness of 
the U.S.-ROK alliance and U.S. favors toward South Korea.”94  
c. In 2012 
On January 6, a government source voiced concern that major changes in the 
operation plan in case of a Korean Peninsula crisis appeared to be inevitable, regarding 
the revision of U.S. defense strategy. The source maintained that, in particular, the U.S. 
military’s large-scale deployment in the Korean Peninsula could be impossible, given the 
fact that the United States had virtually abandoned its strategy of intervening 
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simultaneously in two major wars, and that it had reduced defense costs and the size of its 
armed forces.95  
d. In 2013 
On April 16 at the National Assembly’s Legislation and Judicial Commission, 
with regard to the demand from some political circles for South Korea’s nuclear arming, 
then Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin is reported to have said, “In essence, South Korea is 
in compliance with the principle of denuclearization.”96 He added, “I understand the 
concerns of those who consider South Korea’s nuclearization to cope with the North’s 
nuclear threat. However, I believe that nuclear deterrence against North Korea is possible 
because U.S. extended deterrence and its tailored deterrence are in operation.”97  
On April 25, in response to a National Assembly question to the government, then 
prime minister Jung Hong-won responded to a voice calling for the redeployment of U.S. 
tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea by saying, “The Government has not changed 
the position of denuclearization in the Korean Peninsula.”98 He added, “The government 
will make full efforts to deter the North Korean nuclear threat through U.S. extended 
deterrence.”99  
e. In 2014 
On January 12, an MND spokesman strongly responded to North Korea’s 
condemnation of the U.S.-ROK alliance’s regular exercise by saying, “The U.S.-ROK 
alliance will take over North Korea at once if North Korea provokes against our 
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defensive combined exercise.”100 The spokesman added, “We will hold the Extended 
Deterrence Policy Committee (EDPC) and the table-top exercise (TTX) to discuss the 
practical measure in response to North Korea’s threat of WMD.101 
f. In 2015 
On March 27, Yoon Hwoo-deok, a member of the National Assembly’s National 
Defense Committee, pointed out in a radio program interview with YTN that there is no 
sole agreement on a nuclear umbrella within the U.S.-ROK alliance, saying, “North 
Korea’s nuclear weapons can only be countered by nuclear weapons provided by the 
United States.” He continued that the core of the alliance is a nuclear umbrella, 
emphasizing the need for closer cooperation with the United States to ensure the 
provision of a nuclear umbrella. 
g. In 2016 
On January 7, the leadership of the Saenuri Party referred to the nuclearization in 
the top committee held in the National Assembly. Won Yoo-cheol, then head of the party, 
said, “South Korea needs to fully review its response measure to the North’s nuclear 
threat in the face of the completion of the fourth nuclear test,” adding, “South Korea 
should also have nuclear weapons for the sake of its self-defense.”102 Kim Jung-hoon, 
then chairman of the Policy Committee of the Saenuri Party, also insisted that “we should 
seriously recognize the situation that South Korea is surrounded by nuclear armed states 
and isolated in Northeast Asia.”103 Kim Ul-dong, a top delegation member of the Saenuri 
Party, said, “If the United States does not allow South Korea’s nuclear development, we 
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should demand the deployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in the Korean Peninsula 
for our security as a sovereign state.”104  
On September 13, as a result of confirming the position on the Korean Peninsula 
security issue to eight politicians, who were mentioned as candidates for the next 
presidential election, all eight opposed the independent development of nuclear 
weapons.105 Regarding the issue of relocating U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South 
Korea, three out of the eight were in favor, four were against, and one was neutral.106  
On November 15, after the inauguration of Donald Trump to the U.S. presidency, 
the following analyses and evaluations appeared in political circles of South Korea 
regarding President Trump’s remark that the United States could tolerate nuclear 
weapons development by South Korea and Japan. The former National Intelligence 
Service (NIS) Director Yoo Sung-ok insisted, “South Korea’s own nuclearization would 
delegitimize the denuclearization of North Korea and undermine the international 
cooperation for North Korea’s denuclearization.” He also added, “The independent 
nuclear development of South Korea should be pursued only when the United States does 
not provide nuclear deterrence or the U.S.-ROK alliance actually collapses, even when 
North Korea actually develops and deploys its nuclear weapons.”107  
On the other hand, the Saenuri Party lawmaker Won Yoo-cheol, who has been 
leading the discussion in the political sphere on South Korea’s nuclear arming, said, 
“Given the rapid development phase of North Korea’s nuclear missile capabilities in 
recent years, U.S. extended deterrence has been relatively weakened. Thus, South Korea 
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should not rely solely on the United States to defend itself against North Korea and 
consider its own nuclear arsenal.”108 
h. In 2017 
On January 13, the former Defense Minister Han Min-koo said that President 
Trump’s remark on North Korea’s nuclear weapons is a positive signal for the future 
cooperation in response to North Korea’s nuclear threat and further improvement of the 
U.S.-ROK alliance relationship. Donald Trump, the new president of the United States, 
said earlier that North Korea will never reach the final stage of developing its nuclear 
weapons.109 
i. In 2018 
On February 14, Song Young-gil, the chairman of the Presidential Committee on 
Northern Economic Cooperation Committee, along with seven other lawmakers, 
expressed a concern about the U.S. 2018 NPR that the U.S. Department of Defense 
announced on February 2. They expressed concerns about the possibility of a nuclear 
strike by the United States, saying that a tailored extended deterrence policy against 
North Korea could further accelerate North Korea’s nuclear development.110 
4. Analysis 
The South Korean politicians’ unofficial perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence 
have been diverse, compared to the official perspectives. They encompass both a strong 
confidence in U.S. extended deterrence, as well as an opposite standpoint. A strong 
distrust of U.S. extended deterrence can be identified within the side advocating South 
Korea’s nuclearization or the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons. A neutral 
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viewpoint also exists that pursuing an alternative means, such as the development of 
independent nuclear weapons or the redeployment of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, 
remains practically impossible, despite having no strong confidence in U.S. extended 
deterrence.   
On the other hand, the existing diverse perceptions do not necessarily mean that 
the politicians’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence has constantly changed; the 
diversity may only reflect which politicians are voicing viewpoints at a given point in 
time. The various perceptions might imply that most political figures who have made an 
evaluation of U.S extended deterrence have not regularly reassessed the extended 
deterrence. The diversity of views may also be attributed to the fact that most political 
figures have a consistent political perception of U.S. extended deterrence, depending on 
the individuals’ political leanings. For example, if one politician insists that South Korea 
should pursue independent nuclear weapons or relocate tactical nuclear weapons, that 
politician’s perception tends to be almost consistent. Thus, a wide range of unofficial 
political perceptions does not mean a continual change of confidence in U.S. extended 
deterrence but rather implies the existence of different individual political stances on 
extended deterrence.  
Taking the preceding consideration into account, politicians’ expressed views 
may still be a measure of overall confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. Based on the 
definition of the three levels of South Koreans’ perceptions, the results of coding 
politicians’ official and unofficial confidence in U.S. extended deterrence are shown in 
Figure 4.  
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Figure 4. Three Levels of Political Confidence.  
Analyzing the coding results in percentage terms, South Korean politicians’ 
combined confidence in U.S. extended deterrence has been strong, with a total average of 
80.8 percent, as shown in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. South Korean Politicians’ Confidence in U.S. Extended Deterrence, by 
Percentage. 
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Official Political Perception 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Unofficial Political Perception 1 1 1 1.5 2 1 0.625 2 1
Average 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.75 2 1.5 1.31 2 1.5


























Official Political Perception Unofficial Political Perception Average


























2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Official Political Perception Unofficial Political Perception Average
39 
The official political voices have consistently demonstrated an extremely high 
degree of confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. On the other hand, three levels of 
perceptions—high confidence, neutral position, and strong distrust—have coexisted in 
politicians’ unofficial perceptions. Although politicians’ unofficial confidence has been 
relatively lower than the official one, the combined confidence level of the two has been 
high. As presumed earlier, however, political confidence officially expressed by the 
South Korean government would be hard to deviate from the very strong confidence in 
U.S. extended deterrence. Therefore, in order to examine the actual changes in South 
Koreans’ overall perceptions, subsequent analysis in this thesis utilizes only unofficial 
perceptions that reflect more straightforward confidence than official ones. Figure 6 
indicates these changes in South Korean politicians’ confidence.  
 
Figure 6. South Korean Politicians’ Confidence in U.S. Extended Deterrence 
(Unofficially Expressed Only). 
As revealed through a comparison between Figure 5 and 6, the propensity of 
changes in political confidence remains invariable even if the official confidence is 
excluded. The only thing that changes with the elimination of official expression of 
politicians’ confidence is the percentage, which shows the degree of confidence. This 
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Korean politicians’ confidence. Nevertheless, South Korean political confidence without 
the official component has generally shown a high degree of confidence, with an overall 
average of 61.8 percent. Although annual figures did not always indicate high confidence, 
it was only in 2016 that the data show meaningful distrust of the United States’ extended 
deterrence. 
B. ACADEMIC PERCEPTIONS 
The academics’ perceptions tend to be based on a more in-depth analysis of the 
changes in U.S. extended deterrence derived from the U.S. nuclear strategy, compared to 
the politicians’ perceptions. 
1. Academic Perceptions in Journals and Policy Papers 
This section examines South Korean academic and military experts’ published 
analyses, concerned with perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence, from sources such as 
journals, policy papers, conference reports, and editorials.  
a. In 2010 
Kim Yong-ho, a professor of the Korea National Defense University (KNDU), 
views that the U.S.’s nuclear arms reduction would not weaken its capability to extend 
deterrent forces to its allies and partners, including South Korea. 111 In other words, 
despite the internal and external concerns that the reductions in the role of nuclear 
weapons, the number of nuclear warheads, and delivery means could diminish the U.S. 
extended deterrence capability, according to Kim, the United States could maintain its 
deterrent effects through the enhanced willingness of providing deterrence and modified 
methods.112 In addition, he maintains that the United States could also strengthen its 
moral position by taking the initiative for nuclear arms reductions and increasing pressure 
to promote North Korea’s nuclear abandonment.113  
                                                 
111 Young-ho Kim, “The Obama Administration’s Nuclear Policy and South Korean Security,” Journal 
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113 Kim, “The Obama Administration’s Nuclear Policy and South Korean Security,” 47–69.  
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Han In-taek, a member of the Jeju Peace Institute, has a different view on the 
United States’ nuclear arms reduction. He evaluates that the reductions in the role of 
nuclear weapons, the number of nuclear warheads, and delivery means would diminish 
the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence. He perceives that while the United States’ 
nuclear arms reduction was designed to adapt to a new security environment that deviates 
from the Cold War mindset, in which massive nuclear arsenals were stockpiled, the 
security situation of the Korean Peninsula is still the same as it was during the Cold 
War.114 The key logic behind this view is that the decreased nuclear forces’ role in U.S. 
extended deterrence, combined with the increased conventional weapons’ role, leaves 
little confidence in substantive deterrent effects on North Korea’s nuclear threat.  
Park Chang-kwon, a senior research fellow and a director of Korea Institute for 
Defense Analyses (KIDA) sees the execution conditions of U.S. extended deterrence as 
unclear. 115  He raises questions about what constitutes a condition for operating the 
nuclear extended deterrence.116 Conversely, according to Park, under what circumstances 
the United States would use its nuclear capability remains ambiguous. He maintains that 
the possible situation for nuclear retaliation could rarely be identified and that this 
uncertainty would lead South Koreans to be doubtful about U.S. intentions.117  
b. In 2011 
Cheon Seong-whun, a senior researcher of the Korea Institute for National 
Unification (KINU), claims that the U.S. security guarantees for South Korea “in an 
attempt to denuclearize North Korea,” ironically, “weakened U.S. nuclear umbrella.”118 
As a result, according to Cheon, the U.S. security guarantees for South Korea resulted in 
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supporting the North’s argument that North Korea’s nuclear development was due to the 
U.S.’s nuclear threat.119 He suggests a supplementary measure—namely, redeployment 
of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons in South Korea—to improve the credibility of nuclear 
extended deterrence and simultaneously induce North Korea to abandon its nuclear 
capability through leveraging the redeployed nuclear weapons.120  
c. In 2012 
In his research, “South Korea and the U.S. Nuclear Umbrella,” Cheon argues that 
various policy options should be developed and applied to compensate for extended 
deterrence. According to Cheon, a range of options are under consideration from 
launching an indigenous nuclear weapons program to redeploying American tactical 
nuclear weapons to the Korean Peninsula. He maintains that domestic debates on these 
matters should be seriously considered to provide sound alternative policies. 
d. In 2013 
Park Young-ho, a senior researcher at KINU, argues that South Korea’s pursuit of 
reintroducing U.S. tactical nuclear weapons or developing its own nuclear weapons in 
response to North Korea’s nuclear threat is not a responsible alternative as a member 
state of the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT).121 He adds that 
South Korea should be in compliance with the obligations of the NPT and the principle of 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.122  
e. In 2014 
Moon Seong-mook, a research fellow of the Korea Research Institute for Strategy 
(KRIS), states that South Korea’s nuclearization might be an alternative to consider as a 
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bargaining chip for North Korea’s nuclear abandonment, as well as an option for 
strengthening U.S. nuclear deterrence within the framework of the U.S.-ROK alliance.123 
At the same time, he also argues that the strong opposition of the nonproliferation regime 
led by the United States could cause a decoupling of the U.S.-ROK alliance.124    
An honorary professor at Yonsei University Moon Chung-in insists that South 
Korea should not develop its own nuclear weapons.125 He argues that South Korea’s 
pursuit of its own nuclear arsenal would not only undermine the credibility of U.S. 
extended deterrence but would also create a huge crack in the U.S.-ROK alliance.126 He 
maintains that strengthening the defense capabilities of the U.S.-ROK alliance is the most 
effective way to deter North Korean nuclear threats.127 
f. In 2015 
Kim Jung-sub, a director of the MND, points out that nuclear weapons as a 
component of U.S. extended deterrence have little efficacy and credibility in terms of 
practical use against North Korea’s nuclear threat.128 Rather, he argues, considering the 
precision strike capability of advanced conventional weapons, increasing the role of 
conventional weapons in U.S. extended deterrence is more effective and credible in 
curbing North Korea’s nuclear threat.129 
g. In 2016 
Kim Jae-yeop, a professor at the National Defense Strategy Postgraduate School 
of Hannam University, argues that institutional and physical mechanisms to guarantee the 
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effectiveness of the U.S. commitment to the nuclear umbrella should be developed in 
order to respond to North Korea’s nuclear posture and strategy.130 As a practical measure, 
he proposes that South Korea should establish a plan to acquire its own nuclear arsenal as 
leverage over securing further advanced U.S. extended deterrence.131 
h. In 2017 
Park Hwee-rhak estimates that the probability of U.S. execution of extended 
deterrence is low. Above all, according to Park, the United States would not consider the 
value of Seoul as important enough to risk North Korea’s nuclear attack on U.S. soil. He 
maintains that considering pressure from China and Russia and U.S. domestic opposition, 
the possibility of extending U.S. deterrence would be uncertain.132 
In his assessment of the necessity and feasibility of deploying tactical nuclear 
weapons, Park argues that South Korea must pursue deploying tactical nuclear weapons, 
even if some disadvantages exist. 133  He points out that the strategic benefits from 
introducing tactical nuclear weapons are far greater than the disadvantages that might 
arise from doing so. He regards as major strategic benefits that South Korea could 
substantially improve deterrent effects against North Korea’s nuclear threat and facilitate 
the negotiation of inter-Korean denuclearization. 
Song Seung-jong thinks the ROK-US alliance should fundamentally modify its 
security paradigm in reaction to North Korea’s nuclear threat. He argues that an 
alternative to supplement the limitations of U.S. nuclear extended deterrence’s credibility 
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is to restore the balance of terror in the Korean Peninsula through the introduction of U.S. 
tactical nuclear weapons.134 
i. In 2018 
Cheon Seong-whun, a visiting research fellow at the Asan Institute for Policy 
Studies, evaluates the United States’ emphasis on the importance of tactical nuclear 
weapons as a positive signal for South Korea. The modernization and utilization of 
tactical nuclear weapons, according to Cheon, considerably improves the credibility of 
U.S. extended deterrence because those actions regarding tactical nuclear weapons imply 
the United States’ willingness to retaliate against North Korea.135 
j. Summary 
Figure 7 presents a result of coding the confidence of South Korean academics in 
U.S. extended deterrence, as revealed in journals and policy papers.  
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Figure 7. Three Levels of Academic Confidence in Extended Deterrence, as 
Expressed in Journals and Policy Papers.136 
2. Academic Perceptions in Media 
This section contemplates the newspaper and media interviews, reporting relevant 
experts’ remarks and perspectives. 
a. In 2010 
A military journalist, Yoo Yong-won, raised concerns about the U.S. “strategic 
flexibility” concept of deploying USFK forces outside the Korean Peninsula. His 
perception is that when and if the USFK is brought to another region by urgent strategic 
necessities, a huge loophole in providing U.S. extended deterrence to South Korea could 
occur.137 
b. In 2011 
On August 4, Sejong Research Institute and Sejong University National Strategy 
Institute held a conference on “What could be a counter-measure for North Korea’s 
nuclear threat.” Through a topic presentation, then United Nations (UN) ambassador Park 
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Geun claimed, “The attempt to denuclearize North Korea through negotiations has failed. 
South Korea has no choice but to develop its own nuclear weapons to balance against the 
North, or the U.S.-ROK alliance should remove the North Korean nuclear weapons by 
force.”138  
An opposite argument was also suggested that the pursuit of nuclear weapons 
against the US-led nuclear nonproliferation would be difficult and undesirable for South 
Korea. Kim Hee-sang, a former defense secretary for the presidential office and a retired 
Army lieutenant general, said, “If South Korea is going to develop nuclear weapons, it 
would hurt the U.S.-ROK alliance.” He further argued, “It is more effective to maintain 
U.S. extended deterrence based on the current U.S.-ROK Combined Forces Command 
(CFC) system rather than develop an independent nuclear weapon.”139 
c. In 2012 
Kim Yong-ho, a professor at KNDU, argued that U.S. commitment to providing 
extended deterrence became more visible through an agreement to develop a tailored 
deterrence strategy for North Korea determined at the 44th ROK-US Security Council.140 
He maintained that the preexisting repetition of security commitment created a void in 
credibility, but this agreement would contribute to strengthen the credibility of the U.S. 
commitment.141  
d. In 2013 
Park Hwee-rhak, an associate professor at Kookmin University’s Political Science 
Postgraduate School, stated that an uncertainty about the deployment of U.S. troops may 
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increase in connection with the dismantling of the current U.S.-ROK CFC and the 
creation of a new command system.142 He added that South Korea should prepare for the 
loophole of U.S. extended deterrence that could result from the dismantling of existing 
system.143 
e. In 2014 
Kim Tae-woo, a professor at Dongguk University and a nuclear strategy expert, 
stated the United States must provide extended deterrence to NATO as a requirement of 
that treaty, while the U.S. has no legal obligation to provide extended deterrence to South 
Korea.144 He continued that the provision of U.S. extended deterrence to South Korea 
was not, in fact, guaranteed.145 
f. In 2015 
A senior researcher of the Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy (KIMS), Lee 
Chun-keun, claimed that South Korea’s sole way to escape North Korea’s nuclear threat 
is to develop its own nuclear weapons. He asserts that a state’s nuclearization depends on 
whether or not the state has a willingness to possess nuclear weapons. Accordingly, he 
maintains, South Korea should have the strong will to pursue its own nuclear 
capability.146  
                                                 
142 Hwee-rhak Park, “The Establishment of The U.S.-ROK Combined Theater Command, Extended 
Deterrence Should Be Strengthened,” Tongil Hankook, July 1, 2013, http://unikorea21.com/?p=7773. 
143 Park, “The Establishment of The U.S.-ROK Combined Theater Command, Extended Deterrence 
Should Be Strengthened.”  
144 Hyun-oh Lee, “The Difference Between US-NATO and U.S.-ROK Alliance in the Case of the 
North Korean Nuclear Threat,” New Daily, July 7, 2014, 
http://www.newdaily.co.kr/site/data/html/2014/07/07/2014070700011.html. 
145 Lee, “The Difference between US-NATO and U.S.-ROK Alliance in the Case of the North Korean 
Nuclear Threat.”  
146 Choon-keun Lee, “Acquiring Nuclear Weapons Depends on Our Will,” Premium Chosun, May 18, 
2015, http://premium.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/05/17/2015051700856.html; Lee, “Security 
Crisis Has Never Been Desperate as Current South Korea,” Premium Chosun, May 18, 2015, 
http://premium.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/05/17/2015051700858.html; Lee, “The U.S. Has 
Almost Tolerated Nuclearization of the States that Were Friendly to the U.S.,” Premium Chosun, May 18, 
2015, http://premium.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2015/05/17/2015051700867.html. 
49 
g. In 2016 
“If South Korea challenges the long-standing principle of nonproliferation and 
goes beyond nuclear threshold, it would have to take the U.S.’s non-military retaliations,” 
said Cha Doo-hyun, a research fellow at KIDA and the Korea Institute for National 
Unification. It has been reported, for instance, that if the United States stops uranium 
sales to South Korea, 40 percent of the domestic electricity production of South Korea 
would be lost.147  
With regard to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons, Park Hwee-rhak, the 
chairman of the Kookmin University’s Political Science Postgraduate School, insisted 
that South Korea should consider a joint measure with Japan to request deploying the U.S. 
tactical nuclear weapons in both states.148 
h. In 2017 
Kim Seong-han, the chairman of the Korea University’s International Studies 
Postgraduate School, stated, “No matter how high the credibility of the extended 
deterrence the United States provides for the protection of its allies, the credibility is 
useless if the allies’ citizens become agitated.”149 He added, “South Koreans now do not 
think that U.S. extended deterrence will completely deter North Korea with nuclear 
forces deployed in U.S. homeland and Guam.”150 Kim also argued that either South 
Korea’s nuclear arming or redeployment of U.S. nuclear weapons should be done as a 
response to North Korea’s nuclear threat.151 
i. In 2018 
Yang Wook, a senior research fellow at the Korea Defense and Security Forum, 
pointed out that if the WT-OPCON transition proceeded without thorough preparations, 
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the provision of U.S. extended deterrence would hardly be possible.152 He indicated that 
if the USFK commander conducts operations under the command of the ROK military, 
U.S. strategic nuclear assets could not be deployed in a timely manner.153  
j. Summary 
Figure 8 presents a result of coding South Korean academics’ confidence in U.S. 
extended deterrence, as revealed in media.  
 
Figure 8. Three Levels of Academic Confidence in Extended Deterrence, as 
Expressed in the Media.154 
3. Analysis 
The coding result of South Korean academics’ combined confidence in U.S. 
extended deterrence is shown in Figure 9.  
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Figure 9. Three Levels of Academics’ Combined Confidence in U.S. Extended 
Deterrence. 
Analyzing the coding results in percentage terms, South Korean academics’ 
confidence in U.S. extended deterrence has been moderate, with an average of 42.5 
percent, as shown in Figure 10.  
 
Figure 10. Academics’ Confidence in U.S. Extended Deterrence, by Percentage. 
Overall, South Korean academics’ confidence has been lower than that of 
politicians. Moreover, academics’ perceptions have shown a relatively lower confidence 
level than the neutral position for over more than half of the survey period. Notably, 
academic perceptions, similar to political perceptions, have been diverse and, 
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accordingly, can be categorized into three levels—a strong confidence, a strong distrust, 
and a neutral stance.  
The existence of various perceptions does not necessarily mean that scholars’ and 
experts’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence has constantly changed. These various 
perceptions might imply that most academic experts have not regularly reassessed U.S. 
extended deterrence. Even if some scholars, such as Park Hwee-rhak and Cheon Seong-
whun, have sometimes commented on U.S. extended deterrence, their perceptions have 
changed little over time.  
One difference in the basis of political perceptions is that the academic group 
tends to analyze variations in circumstances surrounding U.S. extended deterrence in 
more detail than politicians do. Yet, given the role of academic experts or scholars in 
advising on the decision of national strategies and relevant policies, the academics’ 
perceptions still seem to be in line with the politicians’ perceptions of U.S. extended 
deterrence. The most vigorously debated issues related to U.S. extended deterrence 
among scholars and experts have been the relocation of tactical nuclear weapons and the 
pursuit of South Korea’s own nuclear weapons. 
The inability to completely identify changes in all individual experts’ perceptions 
and the lack of a broadly representative number of experts qualify the preceding data, 
which show changes in academics’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence. Although 
not many scholars frequently analyze the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence, the 
various perceptions examined in this section remain valuable to identify the existing 
academic group’s confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. 
C. PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS 
This section explores the South Korean public’s perceptions of U.S. extended 
deterrence. Due to the lack of polling directly related to extended deterrence by survey 
institutions, this section utilizes the results of polls about the U.S.-ROK alliance-related 
issues as approximation data. An appreciation for changes in public perceptions of the 
U.S.-ROK alliance can stand in because U.S. extended deterrence operates within the 
framework of the alliance. The thesis utilizes polls concerning the U.S.-ROK alliance 
53 
conducted by the Public Opinion Studies Program (POSP) of the AIPS as the primary 
data. 
1. Future U.S.-ROK Alliance 
Prospects of the future U.S.-ROK alliance can be a valuable source for identifying 
the South Korean public’s confidence in the current alliance relationship, as well as the 
future one. If South Koreans currently perceive the U.S.-ROK alliance as negative, their 
evaluation of future relations will also remain pessimistic. Conversely, support for the 
current U.S.-ROK alliance will reflect positive perceptions of the future U.S.-ROK 
alliance.  
According to the 2013 PSOP of the AIPS, since 2011, more than 90% of South 
Koreans have viewed the U.S.-ROK alliance as imperative in the future.155 Notably, even 
if South Korea’s primary threat from the North disappeared after reunification, a clear 
majority of the South Korean public perceived the alliance as a necessary mechanism.156 
From 2011 to 2013, 75.3%, 84.0%, and 71.2% of respondents, respectively, supported the 
maintenance of the U.S.-ROK alliance after reunification.157 Figure 11 shows perceptions 
of the necessity of the future U.S.-ROK alliance. 
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Figure 11. Necessity of the Future U.S.-ROK Alliance.158 
In relation to the necessity of the U.S.-ROK alliance, public perceptions in 2013 
favored the U.S. military presence in South Korea. The South Korean public appeared to 
support the presence of U.S. troops in South Korea fairly broadly, with 68% overall 
support, due to the perceptions that the U.S.-ROK alliance has been effective in deterring 
the North Korean threats.159   
In 2014, positive perceptions of the U.S.-ROK alliance were also robust, with 
93.3% perceiving the alliance as essential.160 When asked whether the U.S.-ROK alliance 
should be maintained if the economic burden on the South Korean economy increased, 
82.6% remained in favor. 161  This outcome implies that the scope of the U.S.-ROK 
alliance is perceived to extend beyond the North Korean threat. When asked about a post-
reunification situation, 66.0% favored maintaining the alliance.162 Figure 12 presents the 
South Korean public’s perceptions of the necessity of the future U.S.-ROK alliance.  
                                                 
158 The Asan Institute for Policy Studies, “South Korean Perceptions of ROK-US Relations and 
Foreign Affairs.”  
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Foreign Affairs.” 
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Figure 12. Necessity of the Future U.S.-ROK Alliance (as of 2014).163 
2. Current and Future Relationship with the United States 
Like views on the future of the U.S.-ROK alliance, the South Korean public’s 
perceptions of the United States more broadly might approximate their perception of the 
U.S.-ROK alliance and, by extension, of extended deterrence operating within the 
alliance mechanism. As argued earlier, the South Korean public’s support for the current 
relationship with the United States would also involve favorability toward extended 
deterrence, or vice versa.  
In 2016, an overwhelming 86.1% of the ROK public responded that South 
Korea’s relationship with the United States is cooperative, up nearly 5% from the 
previous year, as shown in Figure 13.164 
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Figure 13. South Korean Public’s Perception of the Current U.S.-ROK 
Relationship.165 
Regarding South Korea’s future relationship with the United States, an average of 
72.8% of South Korean public perceived that relationship between the two countries will 
improve, as shown in Figure 14.166  
 
Figure 14. South Korean Public’s Perception of the Future U.S.-ROK 
Relationship.167 
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3. Most Important Security Partner 
Because the South Korean public recognizes the United States as the most 
important security partner, this recognition could also be a measure for estimating the 
public’s degree of confidence in U.S. extended deterrence, as a function of the U.S.-ROK 
alliance. In particular, because U.S. extended deterrence is a representative means of the 
U.S.-ROK security alliance, the South Korean public’s perceptions of the most important 
security partners would be directly linked to those of U.S. extended deterrence. 
In a 2018 poll on security partners, 65% of the South Korean public considered 
the United States to be the most important security partner.168 A majority of the South 
Korean public has maintained this view since 2014 and the degree of confidence has 
gradually increased, as shown in Figure 15.169 
 
Figure 15. South Korean Public’s Perception of the United States as ROK’s Most 
Important Security Partner, by Percentage.170  
In response to another question about the country with which South Korea must 
strengthen its relationship if the United States and China maintain their rivalry, a vast 
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majority of the South Korean public chose the United States over China.171 Moreover, 
from 2014 onward, a majority of respondents has consistently perceived the United States 
as a state with which South Korea should strengthen its ties.172 Figure 16 presents the 
South Korean public’s opinion about future security partners.  
 
Figure 16. South Korean Public’s Preferred Future Security Partner, 2014–
2018.173 
4. South Korea’s Possession of Nuclear Weapons 
The POSP released data from surveys conducted from 2010 to 2016 on the 
public’s perceptions of South Korea’s nuclearization. Interestingly, when respondents 
were asked if they supported the ROK’s pursuit of its own nuclear weapons, the majority 
of respondents appeared to favor South Korea’s possession of nuclear weapons. 174  
Despite the South Korean public’s overall high confidence in U.S. extended deterrence as 
identified so far, the public also largely supported the ROK’s possession of its own 
nuclear weapons, as shown in Figure 17.175  
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Figure 17. South Korean Public Opinion on Developing Nuclear Weapons in 
South Korea, by Percentage.176 
This phenomenon is in stark contrast to conventional wisdom that the greater the 
confidence in U.S. extended deterrence, the weaker the support for South Korea’s 
nuclearization. This contradictory perception may be attributed to a lack of understanding 
of exactly how U.S. extended deterrence operates within the larger framework of the 
U.S.-ROK alliance. The South Korean public may only have a rough idea of U.S. 
extended deterrence, compared to experts engaging in national or military strategy 
concerning the extended deterrence. The tendency of most of the South Korean public is 
not to delve into the details of U.S. extended deterrence, but just consider the U.S.-ROK 
alliance itself, which is the reason most polls in South Korea rarely address a specific 
area concerning U.S. extended deterrence. They instead largely deal with the South 
Korean public’s perceptions of the larger framework of the U.S.-ROK alliance.  
5. Analysis 
The results of the polling just discussed can be combined to show a general 
picture of the South Korean public’s confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. This 
confidence has generally been strong, with an average of 74.1% supporting extended 
deterrence, as shown in Figure 18.   
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Figure 18. South Korean Public’s Level of Confidence in U.S. Extended 
Deterrence, 2010–2018.  
The South Korean public has been supportive of the current U.S.-ROK alliance, 
as well as the general relationship with the United States. They also have been optimistic 
about the future relationship of the U.S.-ROK alliance. In particular, the South Korean 
public has not expressed a neutral opinion or distrust of the U.S.-ROK alliance since 
2010, and a majority has clearly recognized the U.S.-ROK alliance as the most important 
mechanism for South Korea’s security. Accordingly, overall public confidence in U.S. 
extended deterrence, based on the approximation of the confidence level the South 
Korean public has in the U.S.-ROK alliance, can be evaluated as strong.  
But to equate the perception of the U.S.-ROK alliance with that of U.S. extended 
deterrence may be tenuous. If the South Korean public is clearly aware of and has a lot of 
interest in U.S. extended deterrence, surveys conducted in South Korea should directly 
address public perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence. Yet, no direct relevant data has 
been developed in South Korea. This trend might denote that the South Korean public has 
little interest in U.S. extended deterrence or is not much aware of it. Conversely, the 
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existence of data about perceptions of the U.S.-ROK alliance could mean the South 
Korean public largely cares about the alliance relationship. As previously argued, the 
South Korean public’s confidence in the U.S.-ROK alliance involves their confidence in 
U.S. extended deterrence because U.S. extended deterrence operates as part of the U.S.-
ROK alliance. This fact underpins the rationale for approximating the public confidence 
in U.S. extended deterrence through identifying public perceptions of the U.S.-ROK 
alliance.  
D. CONCLUSION 
Combining the three measures developed in this chapter can provide an overall 
picture of South Koreans’ perception of U.S. extended deterrence. As shown in Figure 19, 
overall, South Koreans (i.e., politicians, academics, and the general public) have shown 
moderate confidence in U.S. extended deterrence, with a total average of 59.4 percent.  
 



















































Each group’s confidence in U.S. extended deterrence has changed with differing 
aspects in terms of the degree of confidence and fluctuations. Public perceptions appear 
to have reflected a relatively strong and solid confidence in U.S. extended deterrence 
over time, with an average of 74.1% and small fluctuations. Politicians’ perceptions, on 
the other hand, seem to have varied in their degrees of confidence, from high confidence 
to strong distrust, although overall confidence has remained high, with an average of 
61.8%. Academics’ perceptions also appear to have ranged across various degrees of 
confidence in U.S. extended deterrence, but with more acute fluctuations than politicians’ 
confidence and an average of 42.1 percent of moderate confidence.  
These three differing measures indicate little correlation with each other. First, the 
correlation between perceptions of the academic group and those of the political group 
appears minimal. The degree of confidence fluctuations in U.S. extended deterrence 
varies acutely from year to year, but with little relationship between the two groups. In 
particular, given the significant role of scholars and experts in advising on policy 
decisions, this lack of correlation suggests that the impact of academics’ perceptions on 
politicians’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence is modest: while academics’ 
confidence had risen since 2010, politicians’ confidence had remained the same; while 
academics’ level of confidence in U.S. extended deterrence has dropped since 2012, 
politicians’ confidence has moved in opposite direction. These opposing trends in the 
changing levels of confidence have persisted since then.  
Second, the respective confidence levels of academics and public opinion seem to 
have little correlation to each other: compared to the academic group, the public one 
reflects little variation in the level of confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. Not only 
has public opinion had small confidence fluctuations, but it also has consistently reflected 
a high confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. When academics’ confidence continued to 
increase in 2011, public confidence started to decrease in the same year. Meanwhile, the 
academic group has exhibited acute variations in its confidence level since 2014, but 
public opinion has posted relatively little change in its high level of confidence in U.S. 
extended deterrence.  
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The correlation between the politicians’ and the public’s confidence levels also 
appears insignificant, contradicting the possibility of direct or indirect influence of 
political decisions on public perceptions. While the political group has consistently 
displayed varying degrees of confidence, public opinion has shown a high confidence in 
U.S. extended deterrence, with little variation in degrees and no correspondence to the 
political group. When politicians’ confidence moved toward a higher degree after 2012, 
public opinion moved marginally in the opposite direction, and when politicians’ 
confidence started to decrease in 2014, public confidence moved slightly again in an 
opposite trajectory. Since 2016, public confidence has decreased, albeit by very small 
degrees, while politicians’ level of confidence greatly increased and then decreased again.   
Overall, South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence appear to have 
changed somewhat over time, while overall reflecting a high degree of moderate 
confidence (59.4%) rather than a strong distrust of U.S. extended deterrence. Indeed, 
within moderate confidence, South Koreans’ perceptions remain closer to high levels of 
confidence. This result may imply that politicians and the public, with generally high 
confidence in U.S. extended deterrence, may occupy a larger share of the overall South 
Korean outlook than the academic group, which expresses lower confidence relative to 
those other two groups. The likelihood of the academic group’s small role could also 
indicate the limited influence of academic perceptions on political and public confidence 
in U.S. extended deterrence. 
A debatable point remains: some could say that individual perceptions of U.S. 
extended deterrence have varied in accordance with individuals’ personal political 
tendencies or beliefs. However, because such differences in political tendencies are also 
part of the South Koreans’ perceptions, this thesis accepts the differences as they are.  
The preceding survey of South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence 
leaves unanswered the most important question: why have these perceptions changed 
over time? The following chapters, therefore, identify what specific factors have 
influenced South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence.  
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III. CHANGES IN U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND NORTH 
KOREA’S ICBM CAPABILITY 
Two factors in particular may shape South Korean viewpoints on the credibility of 
U.S. extended deterrence. U.S. nuclear strategy establishes relevant policies and nuclear 
force structure relating to extended deterrence. Hence, the U.S. NPR, which directly 
reflects U.S. political decisions and nuclear capabilities, is crucial to understanding 
changes in U.S. nuclear strategy, including U.S. extended deterrence. Of North Korea’s 
various nuclear capabilities—for example, producing fissile material through plutonium 
or highly enriched uranium (HEU)—ICBM capability particularly has a significant 
impact on the probability of the United States executing extended deterrence. As the 
North’s ICBM capability advances, especially as its missiles equipped with nuclear 
warheads become capable of reaching the U.S. mainland, the United States might have 
less inclination to extend its deterrence to South Korea, due to the possibility of a nuclear 
attack from North Korea.  
This chapter first explores differences between the 2010 and 2018 NPRs with the 
aim of identifying how U.S. extended deterrence capability has changed: has U.S. nuclear 
capability been strengthened or weakened? The chapter then examines how North 
Korea’s ICBM capability has changed since 2012: has North Korea’s ICBM capability 
advanced or been downgraded?   
A. CHANGES BETWEEN THE 2010 AND 2018 NPRS 
This section identifies key policy decisions directly related to extending U.S. 
nuclear deterrence to South Korea, through the NPRs published in 2010 and 2018. It also 
examines the variations in U.S. nuclear capabilities reflected in each NPR. This section 
then contrasts the differences and changes in key policy decisions and nuclear capabilities, 
and concludes with key findings that might affect South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. 
extended deterrence. 
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1. The 2010 NPR 
The 2010 NPR is the third comprehensive review of U.S. nuclear strategy, 
policies, and force structure following the two reviews in 1994 and 2001.  
a. Key Policy Decisions  
The 2010 NPR has as its main context, “putting an end to the Cold War thinking, 
adapting to a changed security environment, and committing to a world without nuclear 
weapons.”177 The 2010 NPR was based on the assumption that, unlike the past when 
sharp conflicts were prevalent, the contemporary security environment was capable of 
seeking strategic cooperation for common security interests among major powers, like 
China and Russia. 
(1) Top Priority and Negative Security Assurance  
The United States placed its top priority on preventing rogue states and terrorist 
groups from proliferating WMD and responding to nuclear terrorism. 178 The United 
States evaluated that the possibility of nuclear war between states is much lower than in 
the past, including the Cold War era, based on the continuous trend of US-Russia nuclear 
disarmament and US-China cooperation for common security threats. 179 Instead, the 
United States voiced concerns about the high probability of illicit nuclear proliferation 
and accidental nuclear war initiated by terrorist groups and rogue states, such as Iran and 
North Korea, which have rejected the obligations of the NPT and continued to pursue 
nuclear ambitions.180 Accordingly, the United States recognized the spread of WMD by 
terrorists and rogue states as a major threat. 
                                                 
177 U.S. Department of Defense, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, DC: Government 
Printing Office, 2010), iv–v, 
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/features/defenseReviews/NPR/2010_Nuclear_Posture_Review_Report.pd
f. 
178 U.S. Department of Defense, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, 9–13. 
179 U.S. Department of Defense, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, iv–v.  
180 U.S. Department of Defense, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, iv.  
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(2) Declaratory Policy for Nuclear Weapons Use 
The U.S. top priority on nuclear nonproliferation, in turn, affected its Negative 
Security Assurance (NSA) policy in a way that encourages non-nuclear states to comply 
with the obligations of the NPT regime: if non-nuclear states follow the WMD 
nonproliferation values and do not develop their own nuclear weapons or illegally 
proliferate nuclear materials, the United States would not use its nuclear weapons against 
them. 181 This revised NSA policy acknowledged that the United States still had the 
possibility to deter WMD attacks with nuclear weapons under certain conditions, and 
reserved the right to adjust the policy based on future proliferation or technology 
change.182 
(3) Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons 
The United States decided to reduce the role of nuclear weapons and instead 
strengthen that of conventional weapons through the 2010 NPR, although it still 
considered “the fundamental role of nuclear weapons” as deterring “nuclear attacks on 
the United States, its allies, and partners.”183 In relation to protection and defense of the 
United States and its allies, the 2010 NPR stipulated that the United States would use 
nuclear weapons only under “extreme circumstances” and that the nuclear weapons may 
play a role in a narrow range of contingencies to deter conventional, chemical, and 
biological weapons attacks on the United States and its allies.184  
(4) Strategic Stability with Reduced Nuclear Force Levels  
The United States determined to maintain its nuclear triad system—sea-based, 
ground-based, and air-based nuclear forces—while adapting to a decreased number of 
nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles within its strategic balance with China and Russia. 
The 2010 NPR aimed to offset a potential loophole that might arise from the reduced 
                                                 
181 U.S. Department of Defense, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, viii.  
182 U.S. Department of Defense, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, viii.  
183 U.S. Department of Defense, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, 15–17. 
184 U.S. Department of Defense, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, vii–ix.  
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nuclear weapons’ role by improving missile defense capability and converting existing 
strategic nuclear systems into conventional roles.185 
The reduction of nuclear weapons in the future represents another key decision. In 
addition to a nuclear disarmament treaty with Russia,186 the United States decided to 
consider further reductions in the number of nuclear weapons.187 The NPR noted that 
U.S. strategic balance between both Russia and China, deterrence against potential 
regional adversaries, and investments in nuclear management programs are the crucial 
factors to consider when further reducing U.S. nuclear weapons.188  
(5) Strengthening Regional Deterrence and Reassuring Allies and Partners 
The United States announced that it will continue to “work with its allies and 
partners to strengthen regional deterrence through enhancing conventional capability, 
missile defense, and counter-WMD capability.” 189  Notably, while the U.S. security 
guarantees to its allies and partners have long been backed fundamentally by its nuclear 
capabilities, non-nuclear means have also played an important role in U.S. extended 
deterrence.190 Regarding the nuclear component in U.S. extended deterrence, the United 
States pointed out that as long as nuclear threats to itself and its allies remain, it would 
retain nuclear weapons, and that it would nevertheless retire nuclear-armed (or equipped) 
sea-launched cruise missiles (TLAM-N).191  
b. Nuclear Capability 
Revealed through the 2010 NPR, the U.S. nuclear capabilities can be inferred 
from policies and plans related to nuclear force structure: U.S. nuclear force structure 
                                                 
185 U.S. Department of Defense, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, ix–x.  
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187 U.S. Department of Defense, 2010 Nuclear Posture Review Report, xi.  
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69 
consists of the number of nuclear warheads and delivery means, development of new 
capabilities, and modernization of existing nuclear weapons systems. First, the number of 
U.S. nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles was slated to shrink significantly. Following 
the renewed nuclear disarmament negotiations with Russia, the United States indicated 
that it would reduce the number of strategic nuclear warheads, delivery vehicles, and 
launchers.192 The United States also pointed out that the Tomahawk—TLAM-N—would 
be eliminated.  
Second, development of new nuclear capabilities and modernization of existing 
nuclear weapons systems were not part of U.S. nuclear strategy revealed through the 
2010 NPR. The United States will “de-MIRV”193 all of its ICBMs so the U.S. Minuteman 
III ICBM will include only one nuclear warhead. 194  Moreover, according to U.S. 
stockpile management principles, the United States will develop no new nuclear 
warheads and only run prolonged life extension programs (LEPs) on existing nuclear 
warheads, such as the B-61 bomb.195 Further, the United States “will not support new 
military missions or provide for new military capabilities.”196 It will instead retain a 
“capability to forward-deploy nuclear weapons on tactical fighter and heavy bombers.”197 
On the other hand, the United States decided to increase various “investments in nuclear 
weapons complex.”198 A new investment in command and control systems was chosen to 
“maximize presidential decision time in a nuclear crisis.” 199  The United States also 
planned to implement another investment in stockpile management and infrastructure in 
terms of both physical and human capital, “to ensure a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 
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stockpile.”200 An investment in leadership and expertise of U.S. nuclear deterrence was 
also included in investment subjects.201  
c. Analysis 
The 2010 NPR implies several signals of weakening U.S. extended deterrence. 
The role of U.S. nuclear weapons and their share in U.S. extended deterrence would 
decrease, while those of conventional forces increase. Although the United States would 
still retain many of its strategic nuclear forces to ensure regional security for allies and 
partners, it would also gradually decrease the role and proportion of nuclear forces in 
extended deterrence. The United States would instead replace the gap with advanced 
conventional capability, combined with missile defense systems.  
The circumstances under which the United States would use its nuclear weapons 
to deter opponents’ WMD attack, particularly a nuclear one, remain ambiguous. Also, the 
policy under which the United States would utilize its nuclear weapons for deterrence 
purpose is unclear. More specifically, whether the United States will retaliate against 
nuclear attacks with its nuclear weapons and how it will deter nuclear attacks are not 
explicitly stated in the 2010 NPR. To a certain extent, this ambiguity is intentional (as a 
deterrent tactic), and not a change from the past. Yet, this uncertainty may increase 
concerns about whether the United States has a strong will for nuclear retaliation when 
and if its allies are attacked by nuclear opponents.  
U.S. nuclear capabilities would be weakened in terms of their absolute power. 
The United States will implement considerable reductions in delivery means, nuclear 
warheads, and additional reduction plans, as presented in the 2010 NPR. Dismantling 
some existing systems related to nuclear capabilities and holding no plans to develop new 
systems and modernize nuclear weapons also could mean a weakening of U.S. nuclear 
capabilities. The investments in nuclear command and control systems, stockpile 
management and infrastructure, and leadership and expertise of nuclear deterrence may 
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be more associated with U.S priority for nonproliferation and safeguards, rather than a 
substantial improvement of U.S. nuclear capabilities. 
Conversely, an opposite assessment of the 2010 NPR is possible. Potential U.S. 
nuclear capabilities might not significantly weaken its extended deterrence because the 
United States would pursue its nuclear disarmament in parallel with Russia’s nuclear 
capability and with sufficient considerations of other potential opponents, like North 
Korea. This analysis implies that, compared to major nuclear powers, such as Russia, and 
minor nuclear states in the world, the 2010 NPR might not have resulted in a substantial 
downgrade of U.S. nuclear capabilities and extended deterrence.  
Diminished U.S. nuclear capabilities may not necessarily equate with weakened 
U.S. extended deterrence. If the loophole possibly created by the reduced role and 
number of nuclear weapons is filled by combining remaining strategic nuclear assets and 
advanced conventional capabilities, this transformed extended deterrence may not be 
significantly different from the previous deterrence or may remain equal. The U.S. use of 
advanced conventional capabilities as a more key element of extended deterrence could 
make deterrence more credible by increasing the likelihood of actual retaliation, from an 
adversary’s perspective.  
Nonetheless, from the perspective of allies protected by U.S. extended deterrence, 
including the nuclear umbrella, objective data related to reduced U.S. nuclear forces and 
their role could easily have been perceived as a weakening signal of U.S. extended 
deterrence capability. What remains certain to U.S. allies is that in the 2010 NPR the role 
and share of nuclear weapons diminished in U.S. extended deterrence. Furthermore, no 
weapon system exists yet to completely replace nuclear weapons.  
2. The 2018 NPR 
The United States released a new and fourth NPR eight years after the 2010 NPR.  
a. Key Policy Decisions 
The 2018 NPR is based on the assumption that strategic security environments 
have rapidly deteriorated since the 2010 NPR release, such as the return of competitive 
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international relations among major powers, increased possibility of armed conflicts, and 
rapidly growing nuclear threats from rogue states, like North Korea.202 
(1) Top Priority  
The United States places its highest priority in the 2018 NPR on deterring any 
form of nuclear attack from potential adversaries. The United States recognizes its 
nuclear forces as a key means for deterring nuclear and non-nuclear attacks, assuring 
security for allies and partners, and achieving national security objectives in the event of 
deterrence failure. 203 Accordingly, the United States is considerably concerned about 
North Korea’s nuclear threat, including its rapid nuclear force buildup and relentless 
nuclear blackmail. The possibility of nuclear terrorism is still emphasized in the 2018 
NPR but is not the top priority. 
(2) Declaratory Policy for Nuclear Weapons Use 
The United States addresses three issues—non-first use (NFU) policy, conditions 
for using nuclear weapons, and NSA policy. First, the United States clearly declares that 
it does not adopt the NFU policy. At the same time, however, strategic ambiguity is 
maintained by not explicitly disclosing the precise conditions for using nuclear 
weapons. 204  The United States also indicates that, in order to prevent potential 
adversaries from making a miscalculation in an attempt to launch a first nuclear strike, it 
will maintain some nuclear forces on standby with immediate launch options.205 Second, 
the United States defines a specific condition of nuclear weapons use: it will consider 
“using nuclear weapons only in extreme circumstances,” meaning nuclear attacks and 
serious non-nuclear strategic attacks by adversaries.206 Regarding the NSA, the United 
States describes that, as with the 2010 NPR, nuclear threats or attacks will not be 
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imposed on non-nuclear states in compliance with the nonproliferation obligations as 
members of the NPT.207 
(3) Role of U.S. Nuclear Weapons  
The United States stresses that it will strengthen the role of nuclear weapons 
because of their irreplaceable role in achieving U.S. national strategic goals. Specifically, 
the United States emphasizes that its nuclear capabilities play a “unique and essential” 
role that cannot be replaced by any other means for deterring nuclear and non-nuclear 
attacks by adversaries.208 This absolute role of nuclear weapons as a crucial means for 
U.S. national strategy also implies the importance of U.S. nuclear capabilities in 
extending its deterrence to allies and partners. The United States underscores that non-
nuclear capabilities, including conventional forces, also “play an essential role in 
deterring adversaries’ aggressions” but do not provide enough deterrent effects, 
comparable to those of nuclear capabilities.209 Notably, the United States points out that 
guaranteeing security only with conventional forces cannot give U.S. allies and partners 
enough confidence in U.S. extended deterrence.210  
(4) Preparing for Limited Nuclear Escalation 
The United States addresses the high possibility of limited nuclear escalation 
caused by non-strategic nuclear weapons, and stipulates the escalation as a new form of 
threat, possibly applied by Russia or North Korea. The United States poses a particular 
possibility of North Korea utilizing the nuclear escalation option in the event of a crisis or 
war-fighting, through the development of strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons 
systems and the threat of strategic nuclear attacks against the United States.211  
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To deter limited nuclear attacks initiated by adversaries’ miscalculations, the 
United States emphasizes the preparation for a limited nuclear war and at the same time 
presents “flexible and limited nuclear response options.”212 The United States maintains 
that “expanding flexible U.S. response options, including low-yield nuclear options,” 
reduces the likelihood of employing nuclear weapons, through increasing adversaries’ 
nuclear threshold and ensuring that “potential adversaries perceive no possible benefits of 
limited nuclear escalation.”213 
(5) Specifying Tailored Extended Deterrence  
The 2018 NPR embodies a tailored extended deterrence to the Asia-Pacific 
region—in particular, against North Korea’s evolving nuclear threat. The United States 
highlights that through leveraging the weaknesses of the North Korean regime and their 
nuclear facilities, deterring the North Korean nuclear threat and disabling its nuclear 
capabilities comprise a firm deterrence strategy of the United States.214 
b. Nuclear Capability 
Beyond retaining its strategic nuclear triad system, the United States seeks to 
modernize it, including tactical or theater-level non-strategic nuclear weapons, and to 
further develop and produce new systems that will replace the existing ones in the near 
future. The United States evaluates that relying on existing LEPs and delaying 
recapitalizations of U.S. nuclear forces have made it difficult to retire old nuclear systems 
and replace them with new ones.215 In addition, by emphasizing the importance of the 
three elements of the triad system—sea-based, ground-based, and air-based nuclear 
deterrence forces—the United States underscores that it will strengthen and modernize 
these systems without delaying and excluding any element.  
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Apart from the systems directly relating to nuclear weaponry, the United States 
strongly urges the need for modernizing its nuclear command, control, and 
communication (NC3) system to oversee and control overall nuclear operations. 216  
Through modernizing the NC3 system, the United States aims to perfect the process, 
from threat detection and warning to decision making and directing of countermeasures 
in a timely manner, while minimizing miscalculation. 
To support and complement low-yield nuclear options, the United States 
announces plans to extend the life of non-strategic nuclear weapons, like the B-61 bombs, 
as well as to enhance the precision-strike capability of the new B-61-12 nuclear 
weapons. 217 These projects also include the global forward deployment capability of 
nuclear bombers and dual-capable fighters, improvement of submarine-launched ballistic 
missile warhead performance, and development of a new type of maritime-launch nuclear 
cruise missiles.218 
c. Analysis  
The 2018 NPR signals the intention to strengthen U.S. extended deterrence: not 
only does it recognize the need to restore and improve U.S. nuclear capabilities, it also 
clarifies when and how to utilize them in U.S. extended deterrence. Regarding U.S. 
nuclear capabilities, the 2018 NPR seeks to change the U.S. paradigm of nuclear strategy 
in a way that reestablishes the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. national strategic goals 
and augments the absolute role of U.S. nuclear weapons. The United States indeed 
recognizes that, compared to nuclear capabilities, non-nuclear capabilities have 
limitations in providing its allies with enough deterrent effects. In doing so, the United 
States plans to modernize its legacy nuclear weapons systems and develop new ones. 
Upgrading current capabilities and further improving them by replacing them with new 
systems would contribute to considerably enhancing U.S. nuclear capabilities, thereby 
strengthening U.S. ability to extend its deterrence to South Korea against North Korea.  
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Conditions under which the United States would use its nuclear weapons have 
become more apparent. The United States clearly intends to use its nuclear weapons for 
extending its tailored deterrence against North Korea’s WMD threats. Moreover, it 
extends conditions for “using nuclear weapons even to non-nuclear strategic attacks.”219 
Leveraging low-yield nuclear capability also clarifies how to deter North Korea’s 
possible nuclear strategy. Although the United States still keeps its strategic ambiguity 
about the precise conditions for using nuclear weapons, the Unites States clearly shows 
its intention and willingness to actively utilize its nuclear capabilities by withdrawing the 
existing NFU policy.  
U.S. nuclear capabilities would be considerably strengthened. Yet, U.S. extended 
deterrence may not necessarily improve proportionally to the enhanced U.S. nuclear 
capabilities in terms of its effectiveness. That is, the efficacy of U.S. extended deterrence 
may vary depending on which party views it. From an adversary’s point of view, the 
augmentation of U.S. extended deterrence might make the adversary aware of the risks of 
provocations, and thereby constrain it from continuing them. Conversely, if the adversary 
feels a greater threat from this U.S. posture and becomes more willing to take risks by 
continuing with a reckless provocation, the effect of U.S. extended deterrence may 
become counterproductive.  
From an ally’s standpoint, however, strengthening of U.S. nuclear capabilities and 
commitments to actively use nuclear weapons are likely to be perceived as a strong 
shelter for the ally’s security. As a result, from the perspective of South Koreans 
protected by the U.S. extended deterrence, including the nuclear umbrella, objective data 
related to the increased U.S. nuclear weapons role and improved capabilities would likely 
be perceived as signals of strengthening the overall U.S. extended deterrence. On the 
other hand, an ally that considers extended deterrence to be already sufficient could 
perceive increased U.S. willingness to use nuclear weapons as unnecessarily raising 
nuclear risks.  
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3. Contrast between the 2010 and 2018 NPRs 
Figure 20 highlights the differences and changes in U.S. nuclear strategy between 
the 2010 and 2018 NPRs in a side-by-side comparison.  
 
Figure 20. Contrast between the 2010 and 2018 NPRs.220 
Five changes in U.S. nuclear strategy related to its extended deterrence are worth 
further discussion: perceptions on the international security environment and top priority; 
the role of nuclear weapons; the NFU policy and the conditions for nuclear weapons use; 
                                                 
220 Items denoted with asterisks are features of the NPRs discussed previously as particularly relevant 
to the credibility of extended deterrence on the Korean Peninsula. 
78 
the importance of non-strategic or tactical nuclear weapons; and a tailored extended 
deterrence, targeting North Korea.  
a. Security Environment, Top Priority 
Although in the 2010 NPR the United States recognized the international security 
environment as cooperative among major powers like China and Russia, it perceives the 
security environment as inevitably competitive among major powers in the 2018 NPR. 
Indeed, the United States views through the 2018 NPR that uncertainty in the security 
environment has increased due to states’ pursuit of their own security interests and 
intensified nuclear threats, compared to an evaluation through the 2010 NPR. The United 
States, therefore, sets its top priority to deter any form of nuclear and non-nuclear threat 
by maintaining nuclear dominance.  
b. Nuclear Weapons Role 
Unlike its view expressed in the 2010 NPR, the United States perceives the role of 
nuclear weapons as imperative in the 2018 NPR. Through the 2010 NPR, the United 
States limited the role of nuclear weapons only in deterring WMD attacks by states not 
participating in the NPT regime.221 The possibility of nuclear retaliation against a nuclear 
attack remained ambiguous. This does not mean a disregard for the importance of nuclear 
weapons. The United States viewed, however, that “fundamental changes in the 
international security environment” made it possible to reduce U.S. dependence on 
nuclear weapons.222  
In the 2018 NPR, by contrast, the United States emphasizes that nuclear weapons 
should not only deter nuclear and non-nuclear attacks but should also be used to retaliate 
against them in certain situations. This policy decision derives from the perception that 
no other means can replace the role of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, the United States 
has decided to improve and strengthen its nuclear capabilities by modernizing relevant 
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programs, while it only sought to retain or modify its nuclear capabilities at a reduced 
level of nuclear forces in the 2010 NPR.  
c. Declaratory Policy: NFU and Conditions of Nuclear Weapons Use 
In the 2018 NPR, the United States explicitly rejects the NFU policy and shows 
its willingness to use nuclear weapons preemptively if required in the event of extreme 
conditions, while it only chose to maintain a strategic ambiguity in the 2010 NPR. 
Compared to the 2010 NPR, the United States, in the 2018 NPR, expands the conditions 
of nuclear use through the term “significant non-nuclear strategic attacks,” 223 which 
provides broader conditions, including existing conventional, chemical, and biological 
attack situations. The potential targets for nuclear use, on the other hand, are the same as 
in the 2010 NPR by maintaining the existing NSA policy. 
d. Importance of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons 
Regarding the pursuit of low-yield tactical or non-strategic nuclear options and 
related mechanisms through the 2018 NPR, the United States emphasizes the importance 
of preparation for a limited nuclear war that might arise from an adversary’s limited 
nuclear escalation, while it intended to reduce the role and number of tactical nuclear 
weapons in the 2010 NPR.  
e. Tailored Extended Deterrence against North Korea 
In relation to tactical nuclear options, in the 2010 NPR the United States did not 
contemplate any tailored extended deterrence for North Korea and was only concerned 
about North Korea’s proliferation ambitions. In the 2018 NPR, on the other hand, the 
United States recognizes North Korea’s growing nuclear capabilities as a major nuclear 
threat and clearly shows U.S. tailored deterrence strategy for North Korea and 
willingness to implement it. 
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4. Conclusion 
Compared to 2010, U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy has been further strengthened 
in 2018. The contrast between the two NPRs, which have been the foundation of the U.S. 
nuclear strategy, policies, and force structure, clearly demonstrates the current, 
strengthened awareness of the importance of nuclear weapons and enhanced U.S. nuclear 
capabilities. In particular, the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. extended deterrence has 
been strengthened and expanded through the 2018 NPR. Through diversifying the options 
in which the United States can actually utilize nuclear weapons, the United States could 
obtain the effect of increasing its deterrence capabilities.  
U.S. extended deterrence capabilities concerning South Korea’s security 
assurance have also been strengthened. By extending U.S. nuclear deterrence to South 
Korea and tailoring its deterrence to North Korea, the United States reveals its 
strengthened willingness to deter North Korea from threatening these allies with its 
nuclear weapons. This policy decision would play a significant role in improving U.S. 
nuclear deterrence, thereby also enhancing the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence.  
The strengthening of U.S. extended deterrence seems demonstrated by the fact 
that North Korea has responded defensively and sensitively to the 2018 NPR, whereas it 
barely responded to the 2010 NPR. 224  North Korea has strongly criticized the U.S. 
political decision pertinent to tailored extended deterrence when the United States 
released a new, revised nuclear strategy through the 2018 NPR. This implies that the 
credibility of U.S. extended deterrence has considerably increased in 2018 over 2010. It 
is unclear, however, whether South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence has 
improved, even if the North Korean regime has perceived U.S. extended deterrence as 
highly credible. This uncertainty is because an ally’s perception of U.S. extended 
deterrence is fundamentally different from an adversary’s perception.  
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B. CHANGES IN NORTH KOREA’S ICBM CAPABILITY 
North Korea has rapidly improved its ballistic missile capability since Kim Jong-
un took the helm in December 2011. Pyongyang has strived to complete its ballistic 
missiles, equipped with nuclear warheads, through six nuclear tests and dozens of missile 
tests using short-, medium-, and long-range missiles. North Korea’s ultimate goal might 
be completing its missile’s capability to reach the continental United States. While 
experts and intelligence agencies have largely agreed on these judgments, they have 
tended to view the actual capability of North Korea’s nuclear missiles differently, 
especially that of long-range missiles—ICBMs.  
This section examines the most relevant analyses of North Korea’s evolving 
ICBM capability as assessed by U.S. intelligence agencies and experts. It aims to find a 
convergent assessment of North Korea’s ICBM capability by comparing and contrasting 
experts’ analyses. Before that, it is necessary to ascertain the criteria to evaluate ICBM 
capability. To explore the frequency of North Korea’s missile tests since Kim Jong-un 
came to power is also crucial to estimate South Koreans’ perception of U.S. extended 
deterrence, because the concentration and intensification of North Korea’s ballistic 
missile tests may cause South Koreans to worry that the United States might not be able 
to extend its deterrence.  
1. Key Criteria for ICBM Capability 
To achieve substantial ICBM capability, several significant elements must be met. 
Just as the Federation of American Scientists (FAS) describes the essential components 
of a ballistic missile with a nuclear warhead, the prime determinants for ICBM capability 
are the qualified function of warheads—miniaturization, and lightening for mounting on 
an ICBM. 225  Hans Kristensen and Robert Norris, prominent experts on nuclear 
nonproliferation, also recognize these factors as main elements when evaluating the 
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capability of a ballistic missile equipped with nuclear warheads.226 Mary Nikitin and 
Steven Hildreth, experts on North Korea’s military capabilities, support this evaluation 
by stating that “the prime objective of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program is to 
develop a nuclear warhead that is miniaturized, or sufficiently lighter and smaller to be 
mounted on long-range ballistic missiles.”227  
Delivery range is another crucial component to determine an ICBM’s capability. 
If North Korea could not make its ICBM reach the U.S. homeland, its ICBM capability 
would remain incomplete. To deliver its ICBM to the United States, North Korea must 
exceed the standard range of 5,500 kilometers. Kristensen and Norris describe ballistic 
missile classifications as Figure 21. 
 
Figure 21. Ballistic Missile Categories.228 
In the end, the development of a standardized nuclear warhead, combined with 
qualified delivery ability, represent essential factors in evaluating ICBM capability. If 
either of these two main elements remains incomplete, North Korea’s nuclear ICBMs 
would not be able to land on U.S. soil. If North Korea has no complete ability to deliver 
its ICBM to the U.S. homeland, the risks of a North Korean nuclear attack to the United 
States will be reduced. If the likelihood of North Korea’s nuclear attack against the 
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continental United States diminishes, the United States presumably would become less 
hesitant to implement its extended deterrence. At the same time, the possibility of 
retaliation would increase if deterrence against North Korea fails.  
2. Frequency of Missile Tests 
Under Kim Jong-un’s reign, North Korea has conducted more than twice as many 
ballistic missile tests as in the past. North Korea had conducted a total of 99 missile tests 
since 2011, whereas it conducted a total of 46 missile tests during third Kim’s two 
predecessors. Of the total 99 missile tests, the ICBM test accounts for six times.  
Figure 22 shows the chronology of North Korea’s missile tests.  
 
Figure 22. Chronology of North Korea’s Missile Tests (1984–2017).229 
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The number of missile tests raises questions about North Korea’s intentions: 
North Korea under Kim Jong-un might have wanted to demonstrate a credible threat both 
to the United States and South Korea; or it may have really wanted to complete its 
nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. While North Korea’s real intention remains unclear, the 
fact that it conducted a considerable number of missile tests during the third Kim’s 
regime in comparison to the past appears definite. The number of missile launches has 
also gradually increased since 2012 and peaked in 2017.  
North Korea’s intensive missile tests during a relatively short period compared to 
the previous regimes would have been sufficient to raise concerns for South Koreans, 
although actual ICBM launch tests only took place six times. North Korea’s increasing 
number of missile tests may have been enough to make South Koreans aware that North 
Korea holds a strong ballistic missile force capable of attacking South Korea at any time. 
The intensive missile tests might also have raised South Korean concerns that the United 
States might not be able to extend its deterrence to South Korea, at least in a timely 
manner, if South Korea should endure the North’s attack. This concern could have been 
further amplified when North Korea tested long-range ballistic missiles aimed at U.S. 
mainland. 
3. Development Process of ICBM Capability 
To identify whether North Korea’s ICBM capability—warhead standardization 
and delivery range—has advanced, this section chronicles North Korea’s activities 
directly related to the two key criteria. 230  It then estimates North Korea’s ICBM 
capability through the utilization of relevant analyses by U.S. intelligence agencies and 
experts.    
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a. In 2012 
In the early stages of the third Kim’s regime, North Korea did not progress 
significantly in its ICBM capability, only achieving a slight increase in its delivery range. 
According to the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) report, a 
Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2, also known as the Unha-3 by North Korean name) ICBM launched 
in April 2012 failed to operate at the second stage.231 After the following ICBM test of a 
TD-2 launched at the end of 2012, an expert on nonproliferation, Mary Nikitin, assessed 
in a Congressional Research Service (CRS) report that North Korea certainly 
demonstrated its ability to put an ICBM into orbit and achieved a greater delivery range 
over the previous launch. Nevertheless, she concluded that North Korea still needed to 
resolve more sophisticated technological issues.232  
Another North Korean ICBM, the Hwasong-13 (KN-08 by U.S. designation), 
which was first unveiled at the North Korean military parade in April 2012, appeared to 
be merely a mock-up for demonstration purposes. The former U.S. Secretary of Defense 
Robert Gates had initially claimed that North Korea had recently developed a road-
mobile ICBM.233 Due to the absence of a series of flight tests and North Korea’s known 
lack of technological skills to mount a nuclear warhead on an ICBM, however, the KN-
08 paraded through Pyongyang appeared to have an incomplete capability as an 
ICBM.234   
b. In 2013 
Contrary to North Korea’s 2013 claim that it utilized a miniaturized and light 
nuclear warhead, North Korea arguably still could not reach the required ICBM capacity 
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in its third nuclear test. Regarding North Korea’s third nuclear test, a vigorous discourse 
took place as to whether North Korea had succeeded in developing a standardized nuclear 
warhead. Based on the explosive yield assessment of North Korea’s 2013 nuclear test, the 
Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) raised the possibility of North Korea’s success in 
miniaturizing its nuclear warheads. The DIA argued with “moderate confidence” that 
North Korea had become capable of delivering a nuclear weapon small enough to mount 
on an ICBM.235  
By contrast, most U.S. intelligence agencies and private experts released 
assessments opposite to the DIA’s view, and many estimated that North Korea had not 
yet achieved its nuclear warhead miniaturization. James Clapper, at the Office of the 
Director of National Intelligence (DNI), claimed that the analysis by the DIA was not an 
official assessment recognized by the Intelligence Community and that North Korea had 
yet to fully demonstrate enough capabilities for a nuclear warhead missile.236 Similarly, a 
founder of the Institute for Science and International Security (ISIS) and expert on 
nuclear weapons, David Albright, agreed with DNI’s assessment that North Korea still 
lacked the necessary capability to deploy a nuclear warhead on an ICBM.237 Air Force 
Global Strike Command (AFGSC) also supported that “North Korea currently does not 
have an operational warhead,”238 but added that it would likely deploy a nuclear ICBM 
like the KN-08 within the next five years.239  
c. In 2016 
In 2016, North Korea began accelerating its ICBM development and has achieved 
considerable progress in its capabilities, compared to the early days of Kim Jong-un’s 
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regime. On February 7, North Korea again launched a TD-2 ICBM and succeeded in 
placing a satellite from that rocket in orbit, albeit unstably. The National Air and Space 
Intelligence Center (NASIC) estimated that the TD-2 could travel more than 12,000 
kilometers and reach U.S. soil.240 The NASIC said, however, that North Korea had not 
yet achieved a re-entry capacity for the TD-2.241  
d. In 2017 
Through a launch of the Hwasong-14 (KN-20 by U.S. designation) ICBM on July 
4, 2017, North Korea partially proved its ability to cross the ICBM’s standard range of 
5,500 kilometers. North Korea, however, failed again to demonstrate a re-entry capacity, 
although it claimed that its re-entry vehicle could protect the ICBM warhead throughout 
re-entry time of the nuclear warhead into the atmosphere.242 On July 27 of the same year, 
North Korea demonstrated more advanced capability to deliver its ICBM farther than the 
previous test, through the second KN-20 ICBM launch. David Wright assessed that the 
KN-20 ICBM could fly a range of 10,400 kilometers, able to reach the U.S. West Coast 
and a number of U.S. cities, such as Los Angeles, Denver, and Chicago.243 However, 
Kristensen and Norris argued that North Korea failed to prove its ability to mount a 
standardized nuclear warhead and to keep the warhead intact after a re-entry.244  
On November 29, following the ongoing improvement in ICBM performance, 
North Korea demonstrated its ability to strike throughout the continental United States by 
launching a new type of ICBM called Hwasong-15 (U.S. designation KN-22). If North 
Korea launched this ICBM with a standard trajectory, according to Wright, this missile 
could reach a range of more than 13,000 kilometers.245 Regarding the KN-22’s weight, 
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however, Wright assessed that North Korea would still be unable to mount and carry a 
nuclear warhead because the warhead mounted on the KN-22 was just a mock-up.246  
4. Current Status of ICBM Capability 
North Korea currently holds four types of ICBMs, including those not yet 
deployed or still in development: the Taepo Dong-2 (TD-2), the Hwasong-13 (KN-08), 
Hwasong-14 (KN-20), and Hwasong-15 (KN-22).247 The TD-2 is a “three-stage, liquid-
fuel, long-range missile that is thought to be a militarized version of the Unha-3 space-
launch vehicle (SLV),”248 which deployed a satellite in orbit in 2012 and 2016.249 The 
Hwasong-13 is a “three-stage, liquid-fuel,”250 road-mobile ICBM, first unveiled during a 
military parade in April 2012.251 This missile was first listed as an ICBM and named as 
the KN-08 at an AFGSC briefing.252 The Hwasong-14, “with the U.S. designation KN-
20, is a two-stage, liquid-fuel,” road-mobile ICBM, first displayed at a 2015 military 
parade and tested twice successively, on July 4 and 27, 2017.253 The Hwasong-15, tested 
most recently on November 29, 2017, is also a “two-stage, liquid-fuel,” road-mobile 
ICBM, known as KN-22 by U.S. designation.254 Figure 23 presents ICBMs currently held 
by North Korea. 
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Figure 23. North Korea’s ICBM Capability (as of 2018).255 
All four ICBMs, theoretically, can reach most of territories in the United States. 
Even with low precision ICBMs, North Korea might be able to inflict serious damage on 
the United States by targeting anywhere in U.S. soil with its ICBM of a valid delivery 
range. Yet, another determinant for the completion of ICBM capability—warhead 
standardization—remains unproven. For this reason, despite North Korea’s repeated 
propaganda of its success in its ICBM development, the existing assessments of major 
U.S. intelligence agencies and experts remain, “Not yet.” Even so, U.S. intelligence 
agencies and experts unanimously estimate that North Korea would be able to perfect its 
ICBM capability within a short period of time.  
                                                 
255 Adapted from Kristensen and Norris, “North Korean Nuclear Capabilities, 2018,” 42.  Hwasong-13 
(KN-08) has not been tested yet since it was first unveiled in April 2012, although it is classified as an 
ICBM-class ballistic missile. 
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5. Conclusion 
Comparing and contrasting the existing analyses by U.S. intelligence agencies and 
experts may illuminate how North Korea’s ICBM capability has evolved and which key 
determinants for evaluating its capability have been grasped by North Korea. Without 
any retrogression and long stagnation, North Korea appears to have improved its ICBM 
capability at a remarkable pace since Kim Jong-un came to power and potentially 
achieved the ability to place the United States within its ICBM range. Nonetheless, North 
Korea seems to have not yet achieved a full standardization of nuclear warheads essential 
for reliable nuclear armed ICBMs and has shown only some of its ability to place its 
ballistic missiles into the ICBM range. 
Despite North Korea’s imperfect ICBM capability, however, North Korea may 
have achieved its strategic goal—securing survivability of its regime through threatening 
nuclear attacks. Through intensive ballistic missile tests, regardless of missile types, 
North Korea seems to have clearly established a credible threat to South Korea. In this 
respect, North Korea may have achieved its desired effect without having actual 
capability to strike the continental United States. Even if South Korea perceives North 
Korea’s ICBM capability as incomplete, this incomplete capability appears to have 
imposed enough threats to the South. The factual confirmation of whether North Korea 
has full ICBM capability is less significant. The psychological impact of how a series of 
North Korea’s ICBM provocations have affected South Koreans is more important.  
In April 2018, Kim Jong-un announced that North Korea no longer needed to 
conduct its nuclear or ICBM tests because it had already achieved its goal of developing 
complete nuclear weapons.256 Considering many experts’ evaluations, Kim Jong-un’s 
declaration may be merely propaganda. Nevertheless, owing to the lack of accurate 
information on North Korea’s actual ICBM capability, it may be rational to assume that 
North Korea acquired substantive ICBM capability. Kim Jong-un may also recognize that 
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an unproven ICBM capability has sufficient deterrent effect. If what Kim wants to 
achieve through his nuclear capabilities, including ICBMs, is to present a credible threat 
to the United States and South Korea, Kim’s declaration seems not to be hollow. If Kim’s 
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IV. IMPACT OF CHANGED U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND 
NORTH KOREA’S ICBM CAPABILITY 
The United States has strengthened its nuclear strategy and further refined the 
tailored extended deterrence to South Korea. Meanwhile, North Korea has rapidly 
evolved its ICBM capability with the aim of targeting the U.S. homeland. How have the 
enhanced U.S. deterrence and North Korea’s nuclear ICBM capability actually affected 
South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence? Have these two factors 
strengthened or weakened the South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence?  
Drawing on the dataset of existing South Korean perceptions demonstrated in 
Chapter II, this chapter examines the impact of the two factors discussed in Chapter III—
U.S. nuclear strategy and North Korea’s ICBM capability—on South Koreans’ 
perceptions of confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. The chapter aims to unpack the 
correlation between the changes in South Koreans’ confidence and these two factors. 
Because little correlation has been shown between the perception of the three South 
Korean groups—politicians, academics, and the general public—this chapter examines 
the association of the two factors on each group’s perceptions. 
A. IMPACT OF STRENGTHENED U.S. NUCLEAR STRATEGY 
If conventional wisdom remains valid that South Koreans’ perceptions are in line 
with U.S. political resolve, nuclear strategy, and relevant capabilities, then changes in 
South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence should also correlate with 
changes in U.S. nuclear strategy between the 2010 and 2018 NPRs. Thus, strengthened 
U.S. nuclear capabilities and commitments to security guarantees through the 2018 NPR 
would improve South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence; diminished 
signals of U.S. nuclear capabilities and uncertain commitments in the 2010 NPR would 
cause South Korean concern and doubt about U.S. extended deterrence. The chart in 
Figure 24 shows the South Korean level of confidence in U.S. extended deterrence in 




Figure 24. Correlation between U.S. Nuclear Strategy and South Koreans’ 
Confidence in U.S. Extended Deterrence. 
1. Impact on Political Perceptions 
Average political confidence in U.S. extended deterrence seems to have been 
high, but the year-to-year variations are apparent. It has reflected various degrees of 
confidence in U.S. extended deterrence, from high confidence to strong distrust. 
Politicians’ perception, except for strong distrust in 2016, has mostly reflected a moderate 
level of confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. Politicians’ confidence gradually 
increased after 2012, reaching an extremely high level of confidence in 2014. Since then, 
it decreased and reflected the lowest level of confidence in 2016. Political confidence 
moved again toward the highest level in 2017. As of 2018, it has declined again to a 
moderate degree.  
The impact of U.S. nuclear strategy on changes in political confidence appears 
insignificant. This outcome is contrary to the expectation that political confidence in U.S. 
extended deterrence will change correspondingly with variations in U.S. nuclear 






















































between the 2010 and 2018 NPRs, the United States will enhance its extended deterrence 
through strengthening its nuclear capabilities and the role of nuclear weapons. Yet, given 
the timing of the two NPRs’ conception and release in 2010 and 2018, respectively, 
South Korean politicians’ confidence in weakened U.S. nuclear forces remained 
unchanged, and their confidence in enhanced nuclear capabilities has declined 
significantly. Rather, the confidence became higher two years after the 2010 NPR’s 
release, remained even stronger in 2017 when the United States decided to strengthen its 
nuclear capabilities through the 2018 NPR, and has declined since the U.S. 
announcement of the 2018 NPR and its worldwide release.  
Accordingly, the relation between South Korean politicians’ perceptions and 
changes in U.S. nuclear strategy appear to have been independent of each other.  
2. Impact on Academic Perceptions 
The academic group has shown various degrees of confidence, with large 
deviations from strong distrust to high confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. Although 
the academic group has shown moderate level of confidence on average, it remained in 
strong distrust for five out of nine years in total. Academics’ confidence started with 
strong distrust in U.S. extended deterrence, but since then, it had gradually increased. 
Since 2012, academics’ confidence has continuously headed toward strong distrust again 
and maintained within low degrees of confidence for four years until 2017. Nevertheless, 
it has rebounded from the lowest level of confidence in 2017 to high confidence. 
The impact of U.S. nuclear strategy on changes in academic confidence seems not 
to be significant, even if the academic group consists of scholars and military experts, 
who might be most sensitive to changes in U.S. nuclear strategy. Contrary to 
conventional wisdom, academic confidence in U.S. extended deterrence increased for 
two years from strong distrust to high confidence after the issuance of the 2010 NPR. The 
academic group’s confidence has considerably increased in accordance with conventional 
wisdom since the release of the 2018 NPR, but other variations make it difficult to show 
a direct association.  
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Due to these contradictory tendencies, academics’ confidence may not correlate 
with changes in U.S. nuclear strategy, including extended deterrence. 
3. Impact on Public Perceptions 
The public group has shown strong confidence in U.S. extended deterrence, with 
no significant year-to-year variation in the degree of confidence. Although the measured 
data derives from the proximate public perceptions of the U.S.-ROK alliance, they are 
well worth utilizing because U.S. extended deterrence operates within the larger 
framework of the U.S.-ROK alliance. The South Korean public had inclined gently 
toward holding a higher level of confidence in U.S. extended deterrence since 2010. 
Their confidence gradually declined, but remained within the high confidence range, 
since 2011. Since 2014, increases in public confidence in U.S. extended deterrence have 
been repeated within a small range, but since 2016, public confidence has moved in the 
opposite direction. Public confidence in U.S. extended deterrence dropped slightly again 
when the 2018 NPR was released. 
The influence of U.S. nuclear strategy on changes in public confidence appears 
negligible. Unlike the conventional wisdom that public confidence would correspond to 
changes in U.S. nuclear strategy, it shifted in exactly the opposite direction. The degree 
of public confidence in U.S. extended deterrence has been not only consistently high, 
regardless of weakening of U.S. nuclear capabilities via the 2010 NPR, but it also has 
reflected a slight decline in spite of strengthening of U.S. nuclear capabilities through the 
2018 NPR. Most importantly, the release of the 2018 NPR did not have a significant 
impact on this generally consistent measure.  
Therefore, the South Korean public’s approximate confidence in U.S. extended 
deterrence may have little correlation with U.S. nuclear strategy.  
4. Conclusion  
South Koreans’ changing perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence rarely correlate 
with strengthened U.S. nuclear strategy, as reflected between the 2010 and 2018 NPRs. 
Most South Koreans are not significantly affected by the augmentation of U.S. nuclear 
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strategy, unlike conventional wisdom that South Koreans’ perceptions will generally 
align with U.S. nuclear strategy, policy decisions, and relevant capabilities embedded in 
that strategy. Only the academic group tends to have some correlation, albeit a modest 
one, with changes in U.S. nuclear strategy. However, considering the academic group’s 
expertise on U.S. nuclear strategy, changes in academic confidence appear to have 
remained largely insensitive to U.S. nuclear strategy.   
Fluctuations in average confidence seem to have been largely affected by 
variations in politicians’ and academics’ confidence, rather than in the public’s 
confidence. This estimation may be attributed to the propensity that changes in average 
confidence and their degrees of fluctuation follow the changes in politicians’ and 
academics’ confidence. The fact that most trajectories of average confidence lie between 
or near the confidence levels of politicians and academics may support this tendency. 
Public confidence, with relatively small fluctuations, does not appear to have a significant 
impact on the fluctuation range of average confidence. The narrow range of variation in 
public confidence may reflect the public’s limited interest in or recognition of U.S. 
extended deterrence.  
The accuracy of the results of South Koreans’ average confidence may depend on 
how well individuals within the three groups recognize the salience of U.S. nuclear 
strategy and extended deterrence. Not all politicians or government officials may have 
addressed U.S. extended deterrence-related issues. Only some of them might have 
considered extended deterrence issues as imperative. Of those few involved, not all have 
always expressed or intimated their confidence, and they appeared to have even rarely 
changed their viewpoints of extended deterrence.  
In the same context, not many academics and military experts are directly 
involved in the U.S. extended deterrence area. And only few have been consistently or 
regularly dealing with problems and policy implications associated with U.S. nuclear 
strategy and extended deterrence. Although the academic group has sometimes perceived 
improvements in U.S. nuclear capabilities as positive signals for enhancing extended 
deterrence, it has tended to consistently maintain critical perspectives on the credibility of 
U.S. extended deterrence, and individuals’ personal views have remained almost 
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unchanged. Public confidence encompasses a different issue: the accuracy of public 
confidence depends on how well their confidence in the U.S.-ROK alliance reflects those 
in U.S. extended deterrence. The public may rarely know nuclear strategy and security 
guarantee mechanisms, such as U.S. extended deterrence, but may only recognize the 
U.S.-ROK alliance. 
Although the political figures examined may not represent the entire political 
sphere in South Korea, identification of politicians’ confidence through a small number 
of political figures still remains valid, because those examined are clearly aware of U.S. 
extended deterrence. Similarly, even if scholars and experts examined in this thesis may 
not represent the whole academic community, these people are still useful to identify 
academics’ confidence, because those examined here are well-known experts on U.S. 
nuclear strategy and extended deterrence. Finally, even though public confidence in the 
U.S.-ROK alliance does not fully reflect their confidence in U.S. extended deterrence, the 
data surveyed based on the U.S.-ROK alliance appears effective, because extended 
deterrence and the alliance are inseparable.  
B. IMPACT OF NORTH KOREA’S EVOLVED ICBM CAPABILITY 
North Korea has been trying to develop its ballistic missiles, equipped with 
nuclear weapons, by conducting intensive missile tests since Kim Jong-un came to 
power, although it may not have succeeded in developing a full-blown ICBM capability 
to strike the United States. If South Koreans’ perceptions correlate with changes in North 
Korea’s ICBM capability, combined with the increasing number of missile tests, their 
confidence in U.S. extended deterrence will be inversely related to the North’s evolved 
ICBM capability: the more the North Korean ICBM capability advances, the lower the 
South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence will be and vice versa.  
The chart shown in Figure 25 presents South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. 
extended deterrence during the period in which North Korea has rapidly advanced its 
ICBM capability. During this period, North Korea has continuously upgraded its ICBM 




Figure 25. Correlation between North Korea’s ICBM Capability and South 
Koreans’ Confidence in U.S. Extended Deterrence. 
1. Impact on Political Perceptions 
Given North Korea’s growing ICBM capability along with intensive ballistic 
missile tests, North Korea’s evolved ICBM capability seems to have had little impact on 
changes in politicians’ confidence. Confidence among those in South Korea’s political 
sphere has not reflected much concern about North Korea’s growing ICBM capability. It 
increased since 2012 and was maintained at its highest level in 2014. From the lowest 
confidence level in 2016, political confidence improved again and reached its highest 
degree in 2017, despite North Korea’s unceasing ICBM tests and ongoing growth in 
ICBM ability. Politicians’ confidence has sometimes moved in the opposite direction 
from evolving North Korea’s ICBM capability, which is in line with conventional 
wisdom. Nevertheless, the politicians’ changing confidence in U.S. extended deterrence 
also reflects detachment from the North’s ICBM ability, as sometimes the degree of 
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Accordingly, the correlation between political confidence and North Korea’s 
evolving ICBM capability appears to have been insignificant. 
2. Impact on Academic Perceptions 
Scholars and experts seem to have been partially influenced by North Korea’s 
evolving ICBM capability. Along with North Korea’s rapid development of ICBM 
capability, academics’ confidence sharply plummeted, gradually turning from a solid 
confidence to a deep distrust in U.S. extended deterrence. Notably, the period when 
scholars and experts became very concerned about U.S. extended deterrence was between 
2016 and 2017, when North Korea began demonstrating its ability to place a ballistic 
missile into ICBM delivery range. Although academics’ confidence temporarily rose in 
2016, it declined in nearly opposite direction from North Korea’s growing ICBM 
capacity, which aligns with conventional wisdom.  
Interestingly, in 2018, academics’ confidence rebounded from strong distrust to 
high confidence, even though North Korea has not diminished or abolished its ICBM 
capability. Notably, North Korea last launched an ICBM-class ballistic missile, the 
Hwasong-15, at the end of 2017, and Kim Jong-un has declared that North Korea would 
halt further missile tests.257 Considering these developments, the high level of confidence 
within the academic sphere in 2018 may mean that scholars and experts might not 
perceive the North Korean ICBM as having complete capability. More interestingly, 
academics may consider North Korea’s intensive missile testing of ICBMs, rather than 
innate capabilities, to be the most acute threat diminishing the credibility of U.S. 
extended deterrence. In this case, the advancement in North Korea’s ICBM capability, 
perhaps together with its intensive missile tests, might have had a greater impact on 
academics’ confidence than the strengthening of U.S. nuclear capabilities. 
3. Impact on Public Perceptions 
The impact of North Korea’s growing ICBM capability on changes in public 
confidence seems to remain minimal. At first glance, the declining confidence among the 
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South Korean public from 2012 may seem to be in relation to North Korea’s evolving 
ICBM capability. Yet, from 2014 onwards, public confidence in U.S. extended deterrence 
became stronger. Most importantly, despite the fact that the North Korean ICBMs have 
come even closer to their ideal ability to attack U.S. mainland, U.S. extended deterrence 
has remained credible among the South Korean public. That degree of confidence has 
fallen very slightly between 2016 and 2018, but was still within the range of high 
confidence, when North Korea had potentially put the entire continental United States 
within its ICBM delivery range.  
Therefore, the South Korean public’s confidence in U.S. extended deterrence and 
North Korea’s evolving ICBM capability have little correlation to each other.  
4. Conclusion 
On the whole, South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence may rarely 
correlate with North Korea’s evolved ICBM capability. In contrast to the expectation that 
South Koreans’ confidence will significantly diminish as North Korea advances its 
nuclear ICBM capability, most South Koreans, except for the academic group, may not 
be considerably influenced by North Korea’s enhanced ICBM capability. South Koreans, 
at first, seem to have been becoming less confident in U.S. extended deterrence following 
North Korea’s improved ICBM capability. Nonetheless, their confidence has gradually 
increased again since 2016, even when North Korea has potentially demonstrated its 
ability to deliver an ICBM to the United States.  
The advancement in North Korea’s ICBM capability should negatively affect 
South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence, because the United States might 
become more hesitant to extend its deterrence to South Korea, when and if North Korea 
threatens to retaliate with its nuclear-armed ICBMs. South Koreans’ overall confidence, 
however, has tended to move away from this expectation, and only scholars’ and experts’ 
confidence has partially corresponded to this expectation. 
Even so, this result alone may not indicate that North Korea’s evolved ICBM 
capability has little impact on South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. 
Perhaps the enhanced U.S. nuclear capabilities also shape this outcome: the diminished 
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South Korean confidence due to North Korea’s evolved ICBM ability may have been 
offset or even increased by the enhanced U.S. nuclear capabilities. Otherwise, South 
Koreans should become more doubtful about U.S. extended deterrence, even though the 
United States has strengthened its nuclear capabilities and reiterated its commitment to 
readily unfold its nuclear umbrella over the Korean Peninsula. The comparison of the 
influence between the strengthened U.S. nuclear strategy and North Korea’s enhanced 
ICBM capability is discussed in more detail in the conclusion. 
Similar to academic confidence, South Koreans’ average confidence also 
increased in 2018. This outcome might imply that although three differing groups show 
different aspects, average confidence may be more negatively affected by North Korea’s 
ongoing missile provocations than by its potential ICBM capability. If so, the average 
South Korean may feel more psychologically threatened by North Korea’s intensive 
missile provocations than by its technical ability related to the ICBM. In this respect, 
frequency or intensity of North Korea’s missile tests, regardless of the missile type, might 
also have a negative impact on South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence.  
The reason for the different aspect in 2018 between political circles and the 
academic community remains uncertain. Unlike academics’ confidence, the confidence 
among politicians dropped significantly in 2018. This result seems also to contradict the 
average confidence in U.S. extended deterrence if the assumption that North Korea’s halt 
of missile tests contributes to improving South Koreans’ confidence appears intact. 
Adding to the influence of strengthened U.S. nuclear strategy, increased confidence 
among academics is in line with both the enhanced U.S. nuclear capabilities and 
suspended North Korean missile tests. Confidence among politicians and government 
officials, however, dips lower in contrast with academics’ confidence. Perhaps this means 
that the two factors—augmentation of U.S. nuclear capabilities and suspension of North 
Korea’s missile tests—may not significantly affect political confidence. Otherwise, North 
Korea’s ICBM capability may still negatively affect politicians’ confidence, regardless of 
North Korea’s missile test suspension. Alternatively, perhaps scholars’ and experts’ role 




This thesis explored factors that might have affected South Koreans’ perceptions 
of U.S. extended deterrence since 2010, focusing primarily on the correlation between 
South Koreans’ changing confidence, evolving U.S. nuclear strategy, and North Korea’s 
evolving ICBM capability. This thesis argued that the strengthened U.S. nuclear strategy 
and North Korea’s evolved ICBM capability appear to have had little impact on changes 
in South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence in this period. The thesis tested 
and supported this argument by examining South Koreans’ perceptions, highlighting 
differences between the 2010 and 2018 NPRs, analyzing North Korea’s ICBM capability 
through key criteria for evaluation, and finally identifying correlations among these 
factors.  
The thesis concludes with four other tasks. It first discerns key findings that can 
be inferred from the outcomes obtained so far. It then draws some policy implications 
from those findings related to key policy questions: How should the U.S.-ROK alliance 
respond to South Koreans’ changing confidence in U.S. extended deterrence? What 
actions are required for the U.S.-ROK alliance to improve South Koreans’ perceptions of 
U.S. extended deterrence? How should the U.S.-ROK alliance deal with the South 
Korean public’s support for the ROK’s possession of independent nuclear weapons? The 
thesis closes with a discussion of the limitations of this research and illuminates potential 
directions for future research.  
A. FINDINGS 
This thesis identified four key findings from the research outcomes.  
1. Weak Correlations   
Changes in South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence do not appear 
directly correlated to the changes in U.S. nuclear strategy and North Korea’s ICBM 
capability. Not only has the confidence of South Koreans been little influenced by 
changed U.S. nuclear strategy, it has also rarely been correlated to North Korea’s 
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changed ICBM capability. Although this finding is not entirely convincing, due to the 
information limitations discussed in prior chapters, by dividing average confidence into 
three differing groups, this irrelevance between South Koreans’ confidence and the two 
factors seems to be more noticeable.  
2. Subtle Dominant Influence 
There is tentative evidence of a subtle combined effect of U.S. nuclear strategy 
and North Korea’s ICBM capability over South Koreans’ perceptions: South Koreans’ 
average confidence in U.S. extended deterrence improved when North Korea placed its 
ballistic missiles within the ICBM range and the United States decided to strengthen its 
nuclear capabilities in response. If the North’s ICBM capability were more influential 
than U.S. nuclear strategy in South Koreans’ perceptions, then the South Korean’s 
confidence should be dampened; if U.S. nuclear strategy were to be sufficiently 
convincing to ameliorate South Koreans’ concerns, their confidence would be offset or 
would even rise. The latter case seems consistent with the result found in this thesis: the 
changes in U.S. nuclear strategy indicating even a little improvement in relevant 
capabilities may be more influential than the enhancement of North Korea’s ICBM 
capability. Nevertheless, the strength of the relationship between the two factors still 
remains closer to uncertain. 
3. Potential Role of U.S. Pledges 
One of the results may imply the role of U.S. ongoing commitments in improving 
South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence: when the United States 
appeared to reduce its nuclear force structure and North Korea started to accelerate its 
development of ICBM capability, South Koreans’ confidence improved, was maintained, 
or, at least, was not significantly diminished. This outcome may also indicate the role of 
the deterrence mechanisms in making extended deterrence more credible. If the United 
States reiterates its firm commitments to South Korea and further suggests developing the 
deterrence mechanisms to ensure its willingness to use full capabilities, South Koreans’ 
confidence may improve, be maintained, or, at least, not worsen significantly, even if 
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North Korea starts spurring its ICBM development. Nevertheless, how certain levels of 
North Korea’s ICBM capability may be offset by these U.S. actions remains unclear.  
4. South Koreans’ Nuclearization Anomaly 
The South Korean public’s strong support for nuclearization is at odds with 
conventional wisdom. The South Korean public has largely been sure of U.S. extended 
deterrence, but they have been supportive of having their own nuclear weapons at the 
same time. One plausible explanation for this stance is an absence of public recognition 
of the precise concept of U.S. extended deterrence operating within a larger framework of 
the U.S.-ROK alliance. Most of the South Korean public seems less aware of U.S. 
extended deterrence and to consider only the U.S.-ROK alliance itself. However, no 
specific signals for correlation with North Korea’s ICBM capability or U.S. nuclear 
strategy exist, and why the public has consistently supported the possession of nuclear 
weapons remains opaque. This irony, however, may provide a significant policy 
implication for improving South Koreans’ understanding of U.S. extended deterrence, as 
discussed in more detail in the next section. 
B. IMPLICATIONS 
The U.S.-ROK alliance must continue its efforts to develop and maximize the 
combined deterrence through close cooperation, while at the same time trying to make 
the South Korean public rightly perceive the important role of extended deterrence. These 
efforts should be carried out bilaterally by both Washington and Seoul, because both 
countries share common security values and interests. 
1. Importance of Continuous Security Commitments 
South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence might be further 
strengthened or, at least maintained, by greater U.S. commitment to sustainable security 
guarantees for South Korea. Although the overall outcome appears to have little impact 
on South Koreans’ confidence, a small part of the results may suggest the importance of 
the U.S. commitment to extended deterrence. No matter how the U.S. nuclear strategy 
changes—whether it implies the reduction of nuclear force structure or the augmentation 
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of nuclear capabilities—demonstrating firm U.S. commitments and implementing 
relevant policies may have positive influences on South Koreans’ confidence. Not 
surprisingly, the existing literature has also discussed the significance of a defender’s 
ongoing security guarantees for its allies and the efficacy of the means and mechanisms 
to implement extended deterrence. If these U.S. efforts are to be supported by bilateral 
cooperation with South Korea through a catalyst—the U.S.-ROK alliance—South 
Koreans’ confidence may become even more resilient. 
2. Importance of Joint Efforts of the U.S.-ROK Alliance 
In this respect, practical cooperative mechanisms between the United States and 
South Korea to improve the combined deterrence capabilities become more important. 
Indeed, the U.S.-ROK alliance has developed a variety of extended deterrence-related 
mechanisms through the SCMs, as examined in Chapter II. Through these mechanisms, 
the South Korean government’s needs may have been more actively discussed over time. 
In particular, given South Korea’s specific security concern, the extended deterrence-
related mechanisms to complement the security loopholes that may arise from the 
conversion of the WT-OPCON may become more imperative for the U.S.-ROK alliance. 
An unexpected collapse of the U.S.-ROK alliance seems unlikely, given the shared 
strategic value and interests between the United States and South Korea. Rather, a close 
cooperation for further development of U.S. extended deterrence within the U.S.-ROK 
alliance seems more plausible. Washington and Seoul should transform U.S. extended 
deterrence into a mechanism that shares mutual security interests of the U.S.-ROK 
alliance, rather than one in which South Korea unilaterally benefits from the United 
States. 
3. Measures for South Korean Public 
The U.S.-ROK alliance may also need to consider and make efforts to inform 
South Koreans of U.S. extended deterrence. As revealed by this thesis, the majority of the 
South Korean public has long supported the ROK’s possession of nuclear weapons. Why 
they have favored South Korea’s own nuclear development is unclear, however. Perhaps 
developing an extended deterrence mechanism and reaffirming the solidarity of the U.S.-
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ROK alliance may not be sufficient. The decisions agreed to by the high-level policy 
makers may need to be actively promoted to the South Korean public. The publicity 
purposes should be not only to inform the public of what U.S. extended deterrence is but 
also to explain why it is imperative. Such efforts by Washington and Seoul may help 
bolster South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence and, by extension, may 
provide U.S. citizens with a conviction that extending U.S. deterrence to South Korea 
would ultimately contribute to protecting U.S. security, too.  
C. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH  
The most significant limitation of the thesis is insufficient data about South 
Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence. The weak correlations between South 
Koreans’ confidence and the two influential factors—U.S. nuclear strategy and North 
Korea’s ICBM capability—may not derive only from their relations themselves. As 
already mentioned, sufficient and accurate data reflecting South Koreans’ changing 
confidence in U.S. extended deterrence is needed to draw an accurate result. Only a small 
number of politicians, government officials, and academic experts have addressed U.S. 
extended deterrence-related issues. Moreover, few have periodically expressed or 
intimated their confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. Even if they did, there was little 
change in their perceptions. Finally, no direct polling data concerning public perceptions 
of U.S. extended deterrence exists.  
The shortage of data, in turn, may obscure the subtle relation between the 
changing U.S. nuclear strategy and North Korea’s ICBM capability in influencing South 
Koreans’ changing confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. Although an analysis on the 
dominance of influence of these factors may seem possible, the outcome derived from 
insufficient data must be tentative. The other reason that the accuracy of the influence 
dominance of the two factors becomes modest is the absence of an analysis of the 
differences between the 2010 NPR and the previous 2002 NPR. This thesis analyzed that 
the United States would reduce its nuclear capabilities through the 2010 NPR. The thesis, 
however, did not analyze how much U.S. nuclear capabilities weakened or whether they 
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actually decreased, compared to the 2002 NPR. This limitation would probably make the 
accuracy of dominant influence even more ambiguous.  
Little or weak correlations—the key finding—may lead to another limitation of 
this thesis: what then might be the actual factors affecting South Koreans’ changing 
perceptions of U.S. extended deterrence? Would consistent U.S. security commitments be 
the most influential factor? Would the South Korean government’s political decisions 
stemming from the ruling party’s political leaning be the determining factor? Would the 
contemporary political and diplomatic relations between the two Koreas be an influential 
factor? Could North Korea’s physical provocations, which did not cause direct retaliation 
by the U.S.-ROK alliance—particularly the United States—be the crucial factor in 
affecting South Koreans’ confidence? Consequently, weak confidence in the results of 
this thesis leads to a new research challenge beyond the discussion of the accuracy of the 
results. 
Lastly, this thesis has the limitation of measuring South Koreans’ perceptions by 
using a qualitative method rather than a quantitative one. Indeed, it is very difficult to 
measure human beings’ perceptions with certainty. In addition, it is more difficult to 
grasp a person’s confidence in U.S. extended deterrence through comments or writings of 
that person. Although this thesis utilized a simplified method defined by the author for 
measuring perceptions, this method does not necessarily justify the results of the 
measurement. Analyzing the correlation between the confidence levels of South Koreans 
and the two factors in this way may also add uncertainties to the results. In the end, all of 
these limitations can guide the direction of future research.  
D. FUTURE RESEARCH 
The most obvious way to ensure a credible outcome and build upon this thesis is 
to conduct a direct survey of South Koreans’ confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. Of 
course, one year’s data would not be enough to identify the changing perceptions of 
South Koreans. Either a professional survey institution or a direct survey by a researcher 
could improve the quality of future research. Such improved research, however, would 
not be able to cover the same period of this thesis.  
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For the same period of study, an additional analysis of the differences between the 
2002 and 2010 NPRs should be conducted. An examination of the differences between 
the two NPRs will be helpful to identify more thoroughly the dominant influence 
between U.S. nuclear strategy and North Korea’s ICBM capability. Further research on 
the 2002 NPR would also enable the results of the impact of U.S. nuclear strategy on 
South Koreans’ confidence to become more credible. 
Expanding the research scope to other potential factors that might influence South 
Koreans’ perceptions will also be of great help in identifying another causal factor that 
leads to changes in their confidence. As mentioned as a limitation, other factors may exist 
besides the two factors examined in this thesis. South Koreans’ perceptions of U.S. 
extended deterrence seem to be influenced by multi-causal factors rather than 
independently by one factor; therefore, a multi-dimensional approach to and research on 
possible factors will be paramount. The additional potential factors are the same as those 
mentioned previously.  
By drawing from quantitative data and applying a more reliable measuring 
method, this thesis might have been able to reduce the potential uncertainties about the 
results. Utilizing statistical methods for analyzing the correlation between dependent and 
independent variables or between the independent variables themselves would also be 
more helpful to derive more accurate outcomes.  
This thesis nevertheless may be the first attempt to identify the correlations 
between South Koreans’ changing confidence in U.S. extended deterrence and the key 
potential factors affecting that confidence, particularly by utilizing more objective data 
through an examination of South Korean perceptions and staying away from subjective 
analyses based on scholars’ own perceptions. 
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